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"The only way to discover the limits of the possible is to go beyond them into 
impossible." 
Arthur C. Clarke 
iv 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For many decades, electric power systems have been operated within the boundaries 
of operating limits imposed by safe but conservative reliability criteria. This approach has 
served the industry very well over many years, providing energy at high reliability levels. 
Nowadays, with the current changes in the electric power market towards deregulation, the 
operators are more and more pressured to operate very close to the operating limits, and thus 
with smaller security margins. Therefore, it is crucial for them to know exactly what these 
limits are. 
Power system deregulation has also forced the operators to integrate some economic 
awareness in their decision making when monitoring the system. It is no longer sufficient just 
to know that the system is being operated at the traditionally safe side of the operating limits; 
they also want to know what the economic consequences are of operating at a certain point 
considering more than just the most limiting disturbances. In other words, the operators want 
lo know what the risk is that they are incurring over a certain period of time while operating 
at a specific operating point. This information will allow them to make much "better' 
decisions in the sense that the decisions will be more defendable because they are based on 
more relevant information. 
1.1 Deterministic operating limits 
Power systems cannot be made completely safe even with infinite expenditure. That 
is why a set of limits is used to maintain a reasonable level of reliability. Traditionally, these 
limits are defined based on disturbance-performance criteria [1][2] and are identified as 
follows: using a chosen system configuration, a list of vital components is set up. Each one of 
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these components is removed and the system is assessed for thermal overload, transient and 
voltage security under a selected set of operating conditions. In what follows, the event of 
losing one or more comf)onents will be referred to as a contingency. By repeatedly simulating 
different conditions, an operating region is identified, where the system performance 
following the contingency satisfies the disturbance-performance criteria. Next, the 
component is put back in service and the next component in the list is removed from the 
system and the process is repeated. At the end, the intersection of all safe areas is taken as the 
acceptable security region (Figure 1-1). 
As can be seen from Figure 1-1, out of a huge list of contingencies, actually only a 
few will define the edges of the security region. The two-dimensional diagram presented 
below, also called nomograms, is used by many utilities to assess the security of their system 
by locating the current operating state in this diagram and by avoiding the insecure region. 
Nomograms are usually plotted in the space of two critical operating parameters. 
The motivation behind the use of this deterministic approach is that it shields the 
system from fault related uncertainties. A few very severe but not necessarily likely 
disturbances are considered, and the system is operated in such a way that it can perform well 
^ ^ flow 2 
Insecure Region 
Contingency 1 
Contingency 2 
Secure Region \ I r _ 
° \ Contingency 3 
flow 1 
Figure I -1. Deterministic security region 
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even if these disturbances occur. Typically the contingencies considered consist of all single 
component outages, considering there are "N" components, this is called the "N-1" 
contingency selection criteria. 
With the current trend towards competitive and deregulated electricity market 
environment, the utilities are forced to guarantee, besides a safe reliability level, also an 
economical operational efficiency. They are feeling some pressure to maximize the 
utilization of their existing facilities and are facing tough environmental restrictions building 
new transmission lines. As a consequence, some operators may consider exploring the 
operating areas beyond the traditional operating limits, where the system is vulnerable to 
costly outages, in order to see if the incurred risk weighs against the potential economic 
benefits of violating the limits. In these circumstances a risk assessment tool becomes also 
extremely usefiil. 
It would be very helpful to identify the level of accumulated danger induced by all 
contingencies, considering their probability of occurrence and their consequences should 
they occur, within the traditionally safe region as well as outside of it. A 'danger' or 'risk' 
index would help the system op>erator to discover operating areas where the probabilities of 
insecurity events or the impact of these events is low. Such an index is defined in this work 
and is called risk. It combines both the probability of the insecurity events and the 
consequences of these events, should they occur. A method is developed to quantify the 
measure of risk. The risk index includes impact and likelihood information of a large list of 
credible contingencies, as opposed to the N-l deterministic limit approach where only the 
worst-case scenario was considered. 
Several authors have considered both the probability and impact of disturbances: 
Silverstein and Porter [3] provided a disturbance-performance table for planning where lower 
performance levels are acceptable for events that are less likely to occur. Alvarado et al. [4] 
used the idea of security regions to develop an expected outage cost for voltage instability. 
Leite da Silva et al., [5] developed a framework for integrating adequacy and security 
assessment, resulting in computation of probabilistic indices for pre-disturbance conditions. 
Counan, et al. [6] devised a defense plan against extremely low probability but very severe 
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system collapse mechanisms. More recently, Aboreshaid et al. [7] define well-being states 
and the probability that the system is residing in each state is calculated. 
Each one of these works comes short of defining an index that measures the risk to 
which the system is exposed at the current operating conditions. In a planning environment, 
reliability indices are used such as is the loss of load probability (LOLP), which only 
includes a reference to the probability but not the impact. Other indices like expected 
unserved energy (EUE) and the loss of load expectation (LOLE) do include some measure of 
severity, but they are restricted to loss of load (customer interruption) and do not account for 
equipment damage or costs due to equipment unavailibilty. For example, Porretta, et al. [8] 
developed a risk-based index that is appropriate for use in a planning environment but here 
again, the only impact that is considered is the load interruption. 
1.2 Risk-based security assessment 
In this work, risk can be more formally defined as the expected cost consequences of 
an insecurity event K over a period of time depending on fault parameters p. at a given vector 
of operating conditions x . It can be computed as follows: 
R i s k { K ( , p )  I x )  = JPr(/r(/?) I T )  •  I m i K i p )  \ x )  d p  (1-1) 
Insecurity events K can be for example, transmission circuit or transformer overload, 
voltage or transient instability. Risk-based security assessment using the above definition of 
risk has been discussed in reference [9]. In reference [10] Wan developed a method to assess 
the risk of thermal overload of a circuit and showed how the thermal ratings of the lines can 
be increased if the thermal overload is approached from a risk point of view. In [11] the same 
author also defined risk-based voltage instability. While the risk assessment discussed in this 
dissertation is focused on an operation environment, in reference [12] Dai presented a 
framework for power system risk assessment in the planning by defining annual risk, 
accumulated from an expected system trajectory. In reference [13], Fu addressed different 
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risk-related topics: impact assessment for risk-based security assessment, risk assessment for 
transformer overload, risk assessment for special protection systems, risk assessment for 
bilateral transactions, and risk-based optimal power flow. 
The major part of this research is dedicated to the development of a methodology to 
evaluate risk of a distinct insecurity problem, namely, the transient instability. Some specific 
features of this type of risk assessment, as well as ways to alleviate the computationally 
intensive procedure, are discussed. In addition, a risk-based decision-making framework is 
presented, capable of assisting the system op)erator to deal with conflicting decision criteria in 
an operation environment. 
1.3 Deterministic limits are risk inconsistent 
Previously in this chapter it was mentioned that many utilities are using the 
(deterministic) nomograms to control the security of the system in an operating environment. 
The definition of risk permits evaluating the level of risk at any point in this diagram, within 
the traditionally safe region and outside of it. The measure of risk wiU allow to estimate how 
dangerous it really is to cross these deterministic limits. 
The deterministic limits are imposed by different contingencies. The contingencies 
have a different probability of occurrence, and when they occur they also have a different 
impact. As a result, they correspond to different levels of risk. If the contours of equal risk 
would be drawn on the nomogram of Figure l-I, the resulting risk-based nomogram could 
look something like Figure 1-2. The bold curved line connects lines with equal value of risk 
and clearly reveals the inconsistencies in terms of incurred risk inherent to the deterministic 
operating limits; some operating points in the safe region actually have a higher risk value 
than some points in the insecure region. This diagram would permit the operators to choose 
the risk level they judge appropriate for their system and could use the corresponding risk 
contour as the new operating limit. 
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^ ^ flow 2 
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\\ of equal risk 
flow 1 
Figure 1-2. Risk-based nomograms. 
1.4 Risk-based decision-making 
The previous section already pointed out the type of decision operators may face: 
which level of risk is appropriate for their system. With the increased urge to operate close or 
even beyond the traditional operating limits, on many occasions the system operators face the 
sometimes-critical situation where they have to decide among several operating options, 
some of them being risky. For example, they may face the situation where they need to 
decide between shedding load, buying power from neighboring area, changing the system 
configuration or not changing anything at all. Their decision will affect the lives of 
thousands, even millions of people, as well as the future of their jobs in particular. 
Risk is an excellent tool to assist the system operators to make the most appropriate 
(or most defendable) decision, as it will permit them to weigh the possible adverse 
consequences of the options against their benefits. One of the aims of this research is to show 
how risk can be used to assist the operator in making crucial decisions regarding the 
operation of the system. 
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1.5 Contribution of this work 
In this dissertation, a further development of the Risk Based Security Assessment 
(RBSA) is presented, with special emphasis on the risk of transient instability: it focuses on 
an index describing the instability risk for generators individually. To be useable in an 
operation environment, the calculation time should be reasonable and various ways to 
alleviate the calculation procedure, in particular the use of artificial neural networks are 
presented. 
In addition, a risk management method is developed by proposing a multi-criteria 
dec is ion-making framework based on risk. It enables the operator to balance the economic 
operation aspects and security considerations in order to make informed and defendable 
decisions in a short amount of time. 
1.6 Organization of the document 
In Chapter 2, the existing transient stability assessment techniques are discussed, with 
special emphasis on the hybrid methods. One such method is explained in more detail as it 
has the features required for risk calculations. Chapter 3 is dedicated to risk of transient 
instability: the probabilistic modeling of the relevant uncertainties is discussed and the 
expressions to calculate the risk of transient instability are derived. Next, in chapter 4, the 
influence of different parameters on the risk of transient instability is observed by applying 
the methodology presented in chapter 3 to the IEEE test system. Chapter 5 deals with one of 
the major problems of the proposed risk procedure, namely the heavy computational effort 
required. Finally, having defined a way to evaluate the risk of transient instability for a given 
operating point. Chapter 6 shows how this index can be conveniently used in an operational 
decision making framework. Chapter 7 closes this dissertation with some concluding remarks 
and some suggestions for future work. 
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2. TRANSIENT STABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Stability is a very broad concept. When talking about stability of a power system it is 
referred to as the ability of the system to regain an acceptable equilibrium state after a 
disturbance or to maintain acceptable equilibrium state under normal operating conditions. 
Many different types of stability exist [ 14]. 
Table 2-1. Different types of instability 
Instability Description 
Transient Synchronous machine rotor angle separation after severe disturbance 
Small Signal Inability to remain stable under small disturbances 
Oscillatory Insufficient damping torque to decrease the oscillations amplitude 
Voltage Voltage collapse due to insufficient reactive support 
This work focuses on transient stability. Transient stability analysis considers the 
performance of a power system subjected to a severe disturbance such as a shunt fault, 
tripping of a phase or an interconnection, loss of a large generator, or a sudden increase in 
load. System stability behavior is directly related with the transient behavior of the 
synchronous machines present in a power system following such a disturbance. Under severe 
circumstances, one or more generators may not be able to remain in synchronism with the 
rest of the system and will go unstable. The rotor angle of the unstable machines will 
separate firom those of the other units. This is also referred to as a generator out-of-step 
condition. The generator will be disconnected from the grid due to the operation of the 
protection relays or part of the system will be isolated (islanding) from the rest of the system 
in order to prevent the remaining part to collapse. 
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The more power the generator is supplying, the likelier it is that it will go out-of-step, 
because the power unbalance resulting from the fault will be larger. In addition, the severity 
of disturbance caused by the fault tends to increase as the fault moves closer to the generator 
bus. 
This chapter offers a brief discussion of the different transient stability assessment 
methods. One particular method will be explained in more detail as it is employed in the risk 
calculations in the following chapters. 
2.1 Transient stability assessment techniques 
2.1.1 Numerical integration of differential equations 
When setting up the mathematical model of a power system with its components, the 
most conventional way to observe its dynamic behavior after a disturbance is by numerically 
integrating a set of differential equations over a certain period. This technique is also called 
assessment by time domain simulation. Since virtuaUy any component can be included in this 
mathematical model, there are no modeling limitations. 
Many books in the literature focus on the modeling of the different elements in the 
system as well as on the numerical techniques available to perform the time domain 
simulation [I5][16]. The methods differ in accuracy, numerical stability and speed. Some of 
the most commonly used numerical integration methods are the Euler method, and the 2"*^ 
and 4"'' order Runge-Kutta method. Other more sophisticated methods have also been used, 
like the Adams-Bashfort predictor formula and the Adams-Moulton correctors formula. The 
solving process with these methods is considerably faster and numerically robust [17]. 
The weaknesses of these methods lie in the enormous computational effort required, 
especially for real-sized networks with a large number of disturbances to analyze. Despite the 
progress of the present day computer technology, this method is still too slow to be used in 
an operation environment. On the other hand, in a planning environment, where time is not 
such a factor, time domain simulations can be very useful because they produce very 
accurate time plots of all possible parameters. 
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Another weakness of the time domain simulation methods is that a system is declared 
stable or unstable after observing (visuaUy or numerically) the time responses of the relative 
rotor angles; there is no clear quantitative indicator to tell that the system is stable or not such 
that the simulation can be interrupted. This is an obstacle that makes automating a large 
sequence of assessments very difficult. 
Finally, when performing the time domain simulation the only possible outcome is an 
answer to the question whether the system is stable or not. It does not produce any type of 
stability measure. It is not easy to tell whether an unstable case is clearly or just marginally 
un.stable. 
2.1.2 Direct methods 
Following the blackout in the USA in 1965. a lot of effort was spent in research to 
develop tools that would make on-line transient stability assessment possible. Researchers 
have tried to develop a method that returns directly the degree of stability of a faulted power 
system based on the Lyapunov theory [18],[19]. An energy function is defined which can be 
u.sed to give a stability measure of the system. The energy injected in the system during the 
fault can be calculated and compared to the critical energy of the system under that fault. If 
the injected energy is larger than this critical value, the system will go unstable - at least one 
machine loses synchronism with the rest of the machines. On the other hand, if the injected 
energy is smaller than the critical energy, the system will remain stable. The Transient 
Energy Function methods, called direct methods, are known to be very fast compared to 
traditional time domain simulation, and they provide the desired stability measure. 
The early versions of the method were considered largely conservative. However, 
with the contributions at the end of the 70's, the credibility of the direct methods increased. 
The concept of potential energy boundary surface (PEBS) was introduced by Kakimoto et al. 
[20]. Methods to determine the relevant or controlling unstable equilibrium point (CUEP) 
were presented in reference [21] and improved with the boundary of stability-region-based 
CUEP method proposed by Chiang et al. [22]. However, despite some significant progress 
made in the last decade the modeling capabilities have always been somewhat limited. In 
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addition, unreliability of the numerical techniques used has resulted in a certain reluctance to 
use them widely. 
In the late 80's, Xue et al. ([23],[24]) developed a somewhat different direct method, 
where the equal area criterion is used for multi-machine power systems, and they called it 
extended equal area criterion (EEAC). It consists in transforming the multimachine power 
system into two equivalent machine systems. The two-machine dynamic equivalent is then 
further reduced to a one-machine-infinite-bus (OMIB) system. The critical clearing time can 
now be calculated using the equal area criterion applied to the OMIB. 
2.1.3 Hybrid methods 
In the past decade, many authors have attempted to incorporate transient energy 
analysis into the time domain simulation. It is believed that this way the best compromise is 
obtained between speed and accuracy when combining the good features of both direct 
methods and time domain simulation. These methods are commonly referred to as the 
'hybrid methods*. Fouad et al. [25] derived a quantitative stability index for each machine in 
the system from the time domain simulation program output analysis. In [26], Maria et al. use 
the Energy Function of the entire system and the output results of the time domain simulation 
to find a stability margin or index. Line searches along linear angle paths are required to fmd 
the crossing point with the potential energy surfaces associated with classical machine 
representation. Tang et al. in [27] present a variation of the method, called the 'second kick 
method', removing the classical model restriction in detecting the PEBS and by replacing the 
line search with a pseudo-fault-on trajectory. Other combinations of methods appeared, e.g.. 
combining equal area criterion with the PEBS method. Zhang et ai.[29] propose a method 
called SIME (Single Machine Infinite bus Equivalent) that combines the above mentioned 
EEAC-method with time domain simulation. At each iteration, the two-machine equivalent is 
recalculated, followed by the single machine equivalent, using the output of the time domain 
simulation. Other combinations exist; in reference [28] EEAC-method is used together with 
the PEBS-concept. 
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2.1.4 Transient stability index method (TSI-method) 
As will be shown later in this work, the speed is a very important factor in the risk 
calculation. If time domain simulations were to be used as the transient stability assessment 
technique, the risk calculation procedure would be far too time-consuming to be used in an 
operation environment, let alone on-line. In the previous section it was stated that the hybrid 
methods perform well both in terms of accuracy and speed. That is why in this work a hybrid 
method is applied. 
In Reference [30], Ejebe et al. propose a method using time domain simulation to 
calculate energy components at each iteration. An early termination criterion is used to stop 
the simulation when the stability or instability has been confirmed and at that point a 
transient stability index is obtained. To alleviate the notations and expressions, from this 
point on this index will be named q>. 
The TSI method is computationally simple and g> is very easy to obtain. The method 
is also very intuitive because the index is closely related with the transient behavior of the 
system. In addition, contrary to other hybrid methods, to calculate the stability index, only 
the results of the post-fault trajectory are used; there is no need for a re-insertion of an 
artificial fault after the fault clearing as there is using the 'second kick' method. However, this 
method only detects first-swing stability. 
The method consists in monitoring the sign of two dot products associated to transient 
energy components; accelerating power/angle or ftheta (Eq. 2-1) and speed/angle or 
speedtheta (Eq. 2-2). 
f { e ) {e - e , )  (2 - i )  
Qj - i e - e^)  (2 -2 )  
where/is the vector of accelerating powers, 0is the vector of angles referred to the center of 
inertia and ft is the vector of angles at the post-fault stable equilibrium point (sep). a 
represents the speed vector referred to the center of inertia. 
After the fault is cleared, the simulation will go on until a change of sign occurs in 
any of the two dot products. A change of sign in the first dot product (Eq. 2-1) before the 
second dot product (Eq. 2-2) indicates that the system trajectory crosses the PEBS, revealing 
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an unstable situation. Not all the kinetic energy has been absorbed by the post-fault system. 
The moment at which this change of sign occurs is recorded as the exit time (Figure 2-1). 
On the other hand, if the second dot product changes sign before the first one, the 
system trajectory starts to swing back and is therefore stable. The system will eventually 
progress to the original stable equilibrium point, or to a new one if switching has occurred 
while clearing. The moment at which this change of sign occurs is recorded as the swing 
back time (Figure 2-2). 
It can best be explained by using the analogy of a car that is given a push towards an 
up-hill slope: the push is representing the fault, and the car will climb the hill while it loses 
speed. If the push is strong, it will roll over the top. and start rolling down the hill at the other 
PEBS 
a 
Stable Equilibrium 
Point 
Figure 2-1. Trajectory of unstable case. 
PEBS 
tswincback 
a 
Stable Equilibrium 
Point 
/ 
Figure 2-2. Trajectory of stable case. 
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side and will accelerate. The kinetic energy could not all be absorbed while climbing 
the slope. The accelerating power changes sign, and therefore also ftheta. In the other 
situation where the car does not reaches the top but starts rolling down backwards 
somewhere on the slope, speedtheta will change sign; it means that the push was not so 
strong, and that the kinetic energy has already been absorbed before the car reaches the top. 
After a change of sign occurs, the simulation is stopped: this early termination criterion limits 
the time domain simulation time to a maximum of 2 or 3 seconds. The index (p is defined as 
follows: 
if stable 
(2-3) 
if unstable 
The complete algorithm for the calculation if ^ is depicted in Figure 2-3. 
When a very unstable case is simulated, the trajectory will quickly reach the PEBS. so 
that the exit time will be very small, and subsequently, the (p very negative. Analogously, a 
very stable situation will result in a large positive (p, because it will swing back quickly. 
In Figure 2-4, an example is given of the influence of two fault parameters on the 
index (p-. For each fault type, the index is plotted against the distance of the fault from the 
generator bus. It can be seen that for this particular situation the generator remains stable for 
any single-phase fault, and the generator goes out-of-step for any three-phase faults closer 
than 80% of the total line length. 
For the purpose of this work, the TSI-method was considered appropriate and is 
conveniently used in the probability calculations, as will be explained later. Nevertheless, 
any other method that is fast and that returns a numerical measure of stability could have 
been applied. 
In the next chapter, it will be explained how this index is used in the risk calculation 
procedure. 
hb (p = \ 
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Only sign 
ftheta 
chansed ? 
Yes 
No 
Only sign 
speedtheta 
changed ? 
Yes 
No 
stop 
stop 
start 
t,=0 
(p = I/ti 
tj = ti + At 
Next iteration 
Calculate ftheta and speedtheta 
Figure 2-3. Calculation procedure for the transient stability index <p 
16 
Fault type/location versus ip 
Distance fnini 
Gen. Bus 
(in % or line kngth) 
Figure 2-4. Influence of location and fault type on the qj index 
2.2 Summary of chapter 
This chapter focuses mainly on transient stability and the different stability 
assessment techniques. The two categories of methods are described and their weaknesses 
are discussed. A third category of methods is presented, the hybrid methods, combining the 
good features of different transient stability assessment techniques. The hybrid method used 
in this work, the TSI-method, is explained in more detail. 
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3. RISK-BASED TRANSIENT INSTABILITY 
In many power systems the operator is concerned about the stability behavior of one 
particular plant that may go unstable for certain faults and under certain operating conditions. 
Traditionally, imposing deterministic security limits certify the security of that plant. These 
limits are defined as the maximum generator or plant power output where a three-phase fault 
at the generator bus would still not lead to instability, eventually with some safety margin. As 
mentioned earlier, the worst-case credible scenario is thought to safeguard the system against 
the uncertainties associated with the consequences of a fault occurrence and with fluctuations 
of pre-fault conditions over the study period. It is very difficult to get an accurate 
measurement of the probabilities of, for example, cascading events. Instead of going through 
this complex calculation, the deterministic method simply adopts a conservative rule, 
accounting for a large number of uncertainties. 
An example of how conservative these criteria can be is illustrated in Table 3-1 
below. The system on which these numbers were taken is presented in section 4.1. The 
results presented further in this chapter, and later chapters are obtained using the same 
system. The plant at Bus 13 consists of three identical 200MW generators that are at risk of 
going unstable, for faults on either line 12-13 or 13-23. Line 11-13 is assumed to be out of 
service for scheduled maintenance. 
The table contains the maximum safe generation levels under each fault type and at 
each line end on either one of the two lines leaving fi^om the generator bus. It can be seen that 
keeping the generation levels below the deterministic limit associated with a three phase at 
the generator terminals (460 MW) the plant is underused, since it has a capability of 
producing 600 MW.' 
' When ihc security limit is higher than the maximum 600 MW capacity limit, the values are indicated in gray. 
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Table 3-1. Power limit levels (MW) for different fault types and locations. 
Line Location Three phase Two phase Line'to-line Single phase 
Line I Near end 460 490 516 564 
Far end 534 ()! ]< i 6' )<l 6' i! ' 
Line 2 Near end 460 486 513 560 
Far end 561 594 '(> n} 
From historical data it is observed that the majority of faults do not occur at the 
generator terminals and the most severe type of fault, the three-phase fault, has a very low 
probability. Moreover, the factors conditioning the disturbances, such as the fault 
characteristics and the pre-fault operating state are probabilistic in nature, and therefore it 
seems natural to examine them from that point of view. 
In short, the drawback of the deterministic approach is that it results in quite 
expensive operating conditions, and excellent sales opportunities at low risk can be lost 
because of these severe requirements. 
The risk-based approach proposed in this work has a similar structure as other 
security problems that have been addressed in earlier works (see chapter 1). In the next 
section, an overview is presented of the relevant work regarding probabilistic assessment of 
transient instability. 
3.1 Review of previous work 
A considerable amount of literature is available on probabilistic transient stability 
assessment. In the late 70's Burchet et al. [31] evaluated dynamic stability by considering the 
stochastic nature of power system parameters. A few years later, a series of papers by 
Billinton and Kuruganty [32]-[34] were published presenting an analytical approach to 
determining the probability of transient stability by evaluating the probability distribution for 
the critical clearing time, fault location and fault type and a probability index was defined. 
They also discuss a way to model the protection system probabilistically [35]. Anderson, 
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Bose. and colleagues [36]-[38] proposed computing a stability distribution from probabilistic 
representation of the event space: disturbance location, type, and sequence. They employed 
Monte-Carlo simulation in this computation. Wu et al. [39] proposed an approach based on 
measuring the time to insecurity. In [41] and [42] the probabilistic nature of the pre-fault 
conditions are taken into account to calculate the conditional probability of instability. In a 
more recent publication from Momoh et al., a probabilistic assessment is presented using a 
measure for the expected angle stability margin [43]. 
Besides probability, risk also includes at the consequences of the system performance 
when the instability has occurred. Dodu and Merlin [44] used Monte-Carlo simulation to 
estimate expected energy not served due to transient instability. 
The first attempt toward risk-based transient stability was presented by Irizarry-
Rivera in [45] and [46], where the concept of limiting operating point functions is employed. 
These functions return the liiniting generation level for any fault type and fault location on a 
certain circuit. This work has been extended in this dissertation. 
3.2 Chapter overview 
In real operating circumstances, the potential transient instability problems that may 
occur in a network are often local and well identified. In this case, the operators usually know 
which generator has a tendency of going out-of-step depending on the operating conditions. 
That is why for them, an index evaluating the risk of this local trouble spot is more helpful 
than a global stability index. In the work described in this chapter, an approach is presented 
that calculates risk of transient instability of a particular plant, by using clarified probability 
expressions, including a more extensive uncertainty modeling, and the impact assessment 
looks at several possible consequences caused by the instability event and quantifies this in 
monetary units. The probability of transient instability is discussed in section 3.3. The 
uncertainties related with fault occurrence, fault typ)e, fault location, fault clearing time and 
load level prediction are integrated in the probability expression. Section 3.4 gives a more 
developed estimation of the impact of transient instability. The risk calculation is 
summarized in section 3.5. In section 3.6, some preliminary work is presented towards a 
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method to calculate risk of transient voltage dip violation. This security problem is closely 
related with the transient instability phenomenon. 
3.3 Probabilistic assessment of transient instability 
The literature about this topic indicates that there are two fundamental ways to 
evaluate the probability of transient instability: the analytical method and Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
3.3.1 Monte-Carlo simulation and analytical approaches 
With a Monte-Carlo process, a simulation is jjerformed where the uncertain 
parameters are modeled with known or assumed probability distribution function. There are 
two approaches: random approach and sequential approach. In the random approach, the 
simulation is repeated each time with new values for the random variables obtained from 
their respective distribution functions. In the sequential approach, the events are studied in a 
chronological succession, where the time of occurrence of a sample state is drawn at random. 
In order to obtain a sufficiently high accuracy, the number of simulations performed should 
be very high, or the simulation study period sufficiently long. Especially, when the number 
of uncertain parameters becomes large, then this approach becomes very time consuming. In 
an operation environment, the speed factor is indeed important and that is why in this work, 
analytical approaches are preferred. 
There are different ways to model the uncertain parameters analytically. With a pure 
analytical method the probability distribution function of the uncertain parameter is obtained 
analytically from the probability distribution function of another parameter from which it 
depends and whose probability function is known. This is possible if the function between 
the two parameters is known. It corresponds to a random variable space transformation. If 
this function is not known, than another analytical method can be used: the conditional 
probability method. It is in fact a simulation method but where the randomness of the Monte 
Carlo simulation has been replaced by a deterministic simulation. The function between the 
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two parameters will be approximated by a set of simulations. The conditional probability of 
instability is calculated through simulation for every given set of uncertain parameter values. 
The total probability is then obtained by integration or summation of conditional probability 
over all possible values of the uncertain parameters. 
In this work, analytical methods are used: a conditional probability of instability for 
the next period (next hour) is calculated for one operating point considering the uncertainties 
related with the fault occurrence (occurrence rate, type, and location). On the other hand, 
assuming a known probability density function (pdf) for the fault clearing error and load 
level uncertainty, these pdf s can be transformed analytically into a density function for the 
stability index (p. 
In this probabilistic approach, it is assumed that the protection system is operating 
correctly: breaker failure is not considered. The event that a fault is not properly cleared may 
be a severe disturbance, but the probability of this event is so low that it would barely affect 
the risk value. This has been shown in [45]. The system configuration is assumed to be 
known. The following notation will be used: a fault is uniquely defined by the following 
variables: circuit C, location Lc on C. fault type F, clearing time rand system load level Pl- It 
is also assumed that these variables are independent. 
3.3.2 Expression for probability of instability 
In this subsection, the probability of transient instability is derived from the 
probabilistic modeling of the fault and system uncertainties. The uncertainties in fault 
occurrence, fault type and fault location are represented by a discrete probability distribution 
function, which allows the calculation to be automated in a structured fashion. It has already 
been demonstrated earlier in Table 3-1, that variation in these parameters have considerable 
influence on the generation limit. The conditional probability of instability with only these 
uncertain parameters is presented in sections 3.3.2.1-3.3.2.4. The uncertainly of the fault 
clearing time and the pre-fault load conditions are included using the random variable 
transformation, as described in sections 3.3.2.5-3.3.2.7. 
3.3.2.1 Fault occurrence 
Each line has a fault rate that can be modeled by a Poisson distribution with a line 
outage rate Ac. This is justified because the probability model of component failure is 
equivalent to the model of the time to the next failure" and typically, the random variable 
n'me to next failure is modeled by an exponential distribution. The reciprocal of this random 
variable, the number of faults over a period of time, is modeled by a Poisson distribution with 
parameter A., being the fault rate. The fault rate can be obtained from historical data. Since it 
is assumed that the line will be outaged for several hours following the fault, a line can only 
be faulted once over the next period (next hour). Therefore, only the probability that one fault 
will occur over the next period is of interest. The probability of having two lines faulted over 
the next period is negligible. The expression for the probability of having a fault on line C is: 
—/t 
Pr(C = c) = ?v(N = 114)= — 
N\ 
= (3-1) 
,v=i 
In the deterministic approach, it is simply assumed that the fault will occur with 
probability equal to one. 
3.3.2.2 Fault location 
To account for the influence of fault location on the probability of transient 
instability, a discrete uniform distribution is assumed for the fault location. According to the 
Bayes-Laplace criterion, the uniform distribution should be used if not enough evidence is 
available that one particular distribution is more valid over another. This is the case here: 
very little historical information is available on the locations of the faults on the lines, so it is 
fair to assume that roughly every location on a line has the same probability to be struck by a 
fault. A more refined assessment of the fault location probability could be performed by 
analyzing the geographical conditions of the area through which each line passes: in a 
forested area, the lines can be touched by the tree branches, an overhead line through an open 
area has a larger probability to be struck by lightening than a line through an urban area. 
Therefore, any appropriate distribution can be used if there is enough evidence pointing 
" It gives the probability that a given number of faults will occur over a certain time period. 
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towards the corresponding probability pattern along the line. The probability of having a fault 
on location Lc of circuit C, given a fault occurs on circuit C, is given by 
Pr(Z., =/iyV^)=— (3-2) 
where M- is the number of segments in which line C is divided. TTie percentage of segments 
leading to instability for a given fault type determines the conditional probability of 
instability. 
In the deterministic approach, it is assumed that the fault will occur at the generator 
terminals with probability equal to one. 
3.3.2.3 Fault type 
The event space consists of four fault types F corresponding to mutually exclusive 
events. They are listed in Table 3-2 in descending order of severity: three phase to ground, 
two phase to ground, line-to-line and single phase to ground. Other fault types have either a 
negligible probability of occurrence or a negligible impact, or both. The severity of the fault 
is measured by the value of the fault impedance; the smaller the impedance, the larger the 
accelerating power, and the more likely the unit will lose synchronism. The fault impedance 
is expressed in terms of the negative and zero sequence impedance, Z**""" and as shown in 
Table 3-2. In this approach, only the effect on the positive sequence network is considered. 
The values of the fault impedances should be calculated at every new operating condition, 
new topology and for each fault location. 
Table 3-2. Fault impedances for each fault type 
n Fault Impedance 
I 3 phase 0 
2 2-phase "^zero ^ ^neg 
) 
3 Line-line Zneg 
4 Single phase Znes ^ ^ zero 
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From historical data we can obtain the frequency f„ of occurrence of each fault type 
given a fault occurs on the line F=n for a particular line, from which then the probability of 
occurrence is derived (3-3). 
Pr(F=A7) = -p2— forn=lto4 (3-3) 
I f ,  /=i 
In the deterministic approach, a three-phase-to-ground fault is assumed with 
probability one. 
3.3.2.4 Probability of instability I 
The event of transient instability denoted as Ks is the event where the unit at risk is 
losing synchronism and is disconnected. To calculate the probability of K, the law of Total 
Probability is applied. The idea behind this law is illustrated with the following example. 
From Figure 3-1, it can be seen that the event A can occur simultaneously with each one of 
the B, events (i = I to n). The probability of event A is equivalent to the summation of the 
intersections of A with the individual B,'s or: 
Pr(A) = Pr(A n ) + • • • + Pr( A o J (3-4) 
Given that Pr(A n fl,) = Pr(A 16,)- Pr(fi.), equation (3-4) can now be rewritten as follows; 
n 
Pr(A) = 2^Pr(A I 6,)-Pr(iB,) (3-5) 
1 = 1 
This expression can be very useful in case the terms conditional probabilities and the 
marginal probabilities Pr(B,) are easier to obtain than Pr(A) directly. This occurs in the 
transient stability case discussed in this work. The event A represents the instability event 
and B, is the fault occurrence event, which consists of the probability of three independent 
random variables, C, Lc, and F. Now, the probability of the event K, of having a generator 
losing synchronism is given by equation 3-6. 
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Bn 
B2 
Bl 
Figure 3-1. Law of Total probability 
'Vi, 'V 4 
Pr(A:^ \x) = ^ '^'Y^PiK,\C = c,L^ =/,F =/i..?) • Pr(C = c) • Pr(L^ =/).pr(F = /2) (3-6) 
c=i/=in=i^ ' yj 
The first term (/) in the summation, is the conditional probability of instability. If only 
fault rate, fault type and fault locations are modeled probabilistically, this term only takes 
two values; one or zero, depending on whether an instability event is detected at these 
conditions or not. The term II represents the joint probability of the fault conditions: it is the 
product of the probability of circuit c being faulted, the probability of the fault on circuit c 
being at location /, and the fault being of the type /i, respectively (3.3.2.1-3.3.2.3). Equation 
3-6 shows that a stability assessment has to be performed for every fault type and location 
condition on every line considered. In the next two subsections, the uncertainties related with 
the fault clearing time and pre-fault load level are discussed. Only after the risk calculation 
has completely been developed, their influence on the risk index can be monitored. This will 
be done in chapter 4. 
3.3.2.5 Fault clearing time 
In Table 3-1, it was shown that the uncertainties dealt with so far were known to be 
influential on the transient stability performance of a system faced with a disturbance. A 
conditional probability of instability is provided in term I of equation 3-6, given a fault of a 
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certain type on a certain location on a certain line. With no other uncertainties involved, this 
probability is zero or one. The error on the clearing time is traditionally neglected in the 
deterministic approaches. 
The time to clear a fault is the sum of the relay operating time and the circuit breaker 
tripping time. The operating times of these devices are both random. In reference [35], a 
more detailed approach is presented to model the protection system probabilistically. The 
density function for the clearing time is obtained from the convolution of the relay and 
breaker operating times. In this work, the clearing time distribution is approximated by a 
normal distribution around the supposed clearing time. 
According to the information provided by some breaker manufacturers, the error on r 
can go up to 10% or even 1 cycle longer than the designed time. The error on the lower side 
of the designed time is a little larger. This uncertainty is modeled here with a normal 
distribution, with 0. Is mean and a 10% or 16.666%^ standard deviation. 
When previously the system suffering a fault type-location combination was very 
close to the stability boundary, the conditional probability was either zero or one, depending 
on which side of the boundary it was. On the other hand, a small error on the fault clearing 
time r can make the system cross this boundary. Consequently, acknowledging the fault 
clearing uncertainty and modeling it probabilistically would lead to conditional probability 
values between zero and one. 
In chapter 2, an index (p is presented to measure the degree of instability, taking 
positive values for stable cases, and negative for unstable cases. The value of the stability 
index (p clearly depends on the clearing time r. This fiinctional dependency is denoted as / 
according to: 
( p  =  f { T ,  C , L ^ , F )  
where the other fault parameters C, Lc, and F are specified. 
' One cycle is 16.66^?^ of the mean clearing time 0.1s 
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According to the method described in section 2.2.4, a negative value of q> represents 
transient instability. Therefore, given the distribution function of r, the probability of 
instability (term I of equation 3-6) corresponds to the probability of (p <0. All probability 
expressions are conditioned on the fault parameters, but the corresponding notations are 
omitted to avoid unwieldy expressions. 
Here, r is the mean (designed) clearing time, and <7^ is the standard deviation, and Tec the 
critical clearing time. This calculation actually only requires the computation of Tec, since the 
values for r and <7^ are assumed. In equation 3-7, the equality sign changes from < to > 
because the function/ is monotonically decreasing. 
3.3.2.6 Load level uncertainty 
Another parameter that can influence the stability behavior of a generator and thus the 
risk value is the load level. When the risk level is calculated on a one-hour-ahead basis, the 
accurate load level values might not be predicted correctly. A multivariate normal 
distribution with a 2% standard deviation for a one-hour-ahead load level prediction is 
assumed. Two extreme situations are distinguished here: perfect linear correlation between 
load levels and no linear correlation between the load levels. The first case corresponds to a 
correlation factor equal to one: all loads change proportionally with the same factor. It is 
actually a pessimistic case, because it means that all individual loads increase together, 
having more impact on the generator levels and thus on the stability. The other extreme is 
when the correlation factor is zero. In this case, the load changes have a smaller effect on the 
Pr(/:^/C = c,L^ =/,F = «,J) = Pr(^<0) = Pr(/(T)<0) 
= Pr(r>/-'(0)) 
Pr(r>r^J 
(r-f)-
(3-7) 
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stability because the various changes are compensated by one other. Since the first case 
represents a more severe situation, the analysis is limited to this one. Only the worst case will 
be analyzed here. The inclusion of this uncertainly is similar to the previous case. The 
functional dependency g of the stability index with the total load level Pl is established, 
given that the other fault parameters are kept constant: 
(p = g(P^,C.L^.,F) 
The probability of instability with uncertain load level is given by: 
Pr(K^ / C = c.L^ = l.F = n,T} = Pri<p <0) = Pr(^(P^)<0) 
= Pr(P^ >g-'(0)) 
P r ( P L > P u )  
oo ^ 2ai (3-8) 
V2^ 
= —^) 
where is the predicted load level and <7^^, the standard deviation, and Pu, the critical load 
level. 
In the case that a longer period of observation is considered, the standard deviation on 
the load prediction will also increase, and the above assumption (total load dependency) is no 
longer valid. In that case, the covariance or the correlation factor for the multivariate normal 
distribution of the load levels should be obtained from historical data. A multivariate normal 
distribution of the load levels is commonly accepted in probabilistic stability studies 
[32][42], although in [41] a discrete probability modeling has been used to represent the 
stochastic nature of the load levels. 
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3.3.2.7 Probability of instability II 
If the error on the clearing time and the load level prediction are considered, term / in 
equation 3-6 can further be rewritten, assuming a bivariate normal distribution for the 
clearing time and load level: 
oo oe 
P { K , \ C  =  c , L ^  = l , F  =  n , T ^ =  ^  j  I  C  =  c , L ^  =  L  F  =  n.x)dT • (3-9) 
r.. Pu 
Note that there is a dependency between Tcc, the critical clearing time and Pu. the 
critical load level. 
3.4 Impact/Damage assessment 
The second component of risk is the impact or cost consequence. The impact is very 
system specific, so a general approach is identifying all possible costs of instability and the 
entities incurring these costs is presented. In chapter 4, this perspective will be narrowed to 
that of the generator owner. 
A transient instability event causes the generator to accelerate and go out-of-step. The 
power produced by the The overspeed protection will act to protect the generator circuits 
against large electromagnetic forces. The unit will be tripped and will remain out of service 
for a period time. In this study, the length of this period is taken as the average down time of 
the unit, or also referred to as the mean-time to repair (MTTR). During this time, the 
machine needs to be inspected and may need some maintenance and repair, especially at the 
windings and at the insulation which could have been damaged. 
The costs associated with a transient instability are divided into three categories: 
I. Generator repair and start-up costs - Impart 
After an out-of-step condition the generator is taken off-line for a repair and 
maintenance - repair costs Crep- A certain amount of effort and fiiel must be 
used to bring the unit back on-line: this cost is called start-up costs CMn-
^rep " ^ start 
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II. Opportunity cost - Im„p 
When a unit is taken out of service the lost generation needs to be picked up 
by another, probably less efficient generator having a higher fuel cost rate. 
Depending on the operation context, several scenarios can happen. In case the 
owner of the disconnected unit still has enough reserves to pick up the lost 
generation, the cost will be merely an economic dispatch cost difference. If 
the lost generation has to come fi-om another supplier, the owner of the lost 
unit will lose the revenue from the power it was supposed to deliver, with a 
possible penalty. He also might buy the lost power from another generation 
company: in that case, the cost will be the difference between the purchase 
cost and the production cost. 
This cost is calculated as follows: 
new ^old ) ' ' ^losl 
where Cnew is the cost per MWhr during the outage, and Cou is the cost per 
MWhr prior to the outage, h is the duration of the outage, and Pi„st is the 
amount of generation that the tripped unit was supplying. 
III. Loss of load - Iniumd 
Tripping a generation unit will initially cause a deficit in power supply over 
the system, causing the frequency to drop. If the frequency drops below a 
certain level for a specified amount of time, an under-frequency load shedding 
relay will activate some breakers to interrupt a pre-set block of load. The 
amount of load that will be shed for a given fault depends on the relay 
settings. This impact is especially system dependent. 
The cost of the loss of load is calculated by multiplying the amount of 
shedded load by the per MWhr penalty factor Cpe,, and the duration h. 
^^^load ^pen ' ' ^shed 
IV. Penalties for reliability criteria violation - Iniyi,,/ 
NERC is poised to implement "compliance measures" that identify economic 
penalties for violating reliability criteria. 
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V. Cascading events - /mw„/ 
These are very difficult to quantify, but potentially large. 
The total impact is the sum of the three types of costs: 
IniiKc Lr) = 
(3-10) 
I'^sian I ^ (^S ' ^ + ^'"cascif^S ' 
3.5 Overview of the risk calculation methodology 
With the probability of instability defined in section 3.3. and the impact described in 
section 3.4, the risk is calculated as the product of both. Since risk is actually the expectation 
of the impact, the procedure above can also be interpreted as the development of a 
probability mass fiinction for the random variable impact Im. Indeed, the impact has a 
Bemouilli distribution function with probability p. The complete algorithm for risk of 
transient instability calculation is shown in Figure 3-2. 
The probability p is the total probability of instability expressed by equation 3-6 
together with equation 3-9. With a Bemouilli distribution fiinction (Eq. 3-11), the expected 
value E[Im] of the impact is obtained as shown in Eq. 3-12. 
hn ~ Bemouilliip) Im = • (3-11) 
0 l - p  
Risk{K^ I.?) = £[Im] = / xp + 0-(1 — p) = / xp (3-12) 
In order to obtain system-wide risk of instability when differen^l^achines are at risk 
of going out-of-step, the procedure is repeated for each one of the at-risk generators and the 
sum of all individual risks will give the total system risk. 
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Figure 3-2. Transient instability risk calculation overview for one operating point. 
3.6 Voltage Dip Assessment 
The transient behavior of power systems does not only depend on whether angle instability 
occurs or not. After a large disturbance, the system will experience rotor angle swings, 
causing the voltage to fluctuate at various buses and possibly drop to dangerously low 
voltage levels. This insecurity problem that is related to the transient instability phenomenon, 
has received a lot of attention from the utilities because of its potentially severe 
consequences. In this section, some preliminary work is presented of a methodology to 
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calculate the risk of voltage dip violation. Expressions for the probability and impact of 
voltage dip violations are presented. However, additional work is required to work out the 
details of the method, as well as to implement the method and to find ways to reduce its 
computational effort. 
If the voltage dip is significant in magnitude and duration, some under-voltage 
protection relays may trip large induction motors and industrial drives, possibly causing 
substantial damage to industrial processes, even if no angle instability has occurred. In 
particular, in nuclear power plants a significant voltage dip can be interpreted by the 
protection equipment as a loss of coolant, leading to the whole unit being tripped [47]. It is 
for these two reasons that transient stability reliability criteria also include a performance 
limit associated with transient voltage dips. Depending on the types of load connected to a 
system, the voltage dips should not be deeper than a certain limit (15. 20% of the nominal 
value) and not for more than a certain time (in transmission level 0.05s, 0.15s). This 
performance requirement can be sometimes more restrictive than the angle stability 
requirements. 
According to Debs [50], the maximum voltage dip in the system will occur at the 
point where the transient potential energy also is at its maximum. At this point, the angular 
separation between the critical machines and the rest of the machines is maximal. Since, at 
this condition, the machine voltage magnitudes are out of phase with each other, it is argued 
that the bus voltage magnitudes will dip to their lowest levels. 
The problem here will be the assessment of the voltage dip either in time, as in 
duration. Using time-domain simulation will be very time-consuming. In the literature, the 
use of TEF methodology was proposed to find the angle where the maximum voltage drop 
occurs [48]-[52]. In [53] the use of ANN was suggested to predict both the voltage dip and 
the dip duration. 
3.6.1 Risk-based approach 
As in the previous risk assessment approaches, the probability and impact of the 
voltage dip violations needs to be calculated. A voltage dip assessment methodology needs to 
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be specified, in the same way a transient stability assessment tool is used in the transient 
stability risk approach. 
When assessing the impact of voltage dip violation, it is necessary to evaluate both 
the magnitude of the dip as well as the duration of the dip below a limit value. Most loads are 
protected against under or over voltage by protection relays. The operation of this protection 
system is dependent on the composition of the load at that bus. Some loads are more 
sensitive than others to voltage dips and have a narrow voltage toleration band. 
The event of transient instability will either occur or will not occur, and the cost 
consequences when instability occurs is assumed to be only dependent on the operating 
conditions, not on the fault conditions. On the other hand, voltage dips occur with different 
severity in terms of magnitudes and durations, and the consequences of voltage dips depend 
on this severity as well as the load mix affected by the voltage dip. In addition, they also 
depend on the fault conditions. In other words, where transient instability is a discrete event, 
voltage dip is continuous, and probabilistic modeling must reflect this difference. 
For a given fault condition (line, location on line and type), the voltage dip profile at 
each bus needs to be evaluated. Voltages reach their lowest level at some time after the fault 
is cleared. The duration is measured as the time the voltage magnitude remains below a 
certain limit. Since the voltage dip magnitude and the duration limit depend on the 
composition of the load connected at the bus at the moment of the fault, it is difficult to 
determine these limits precisely, and they are therefore considered to be random variables 
and their probability density functions can be estimated through simulation using statistics 
for load voltage sensitivities. 
The objective is to obtain the expected value for the impact caused by the voltage dip 
violation. The deeper the dip, the more important will be the consequences, the more load 
will be shed. As opposed to the transient stability term where the impact incurred was either 
total or zero, here the impact is dependent on the extent (in terms of magnitude and duration) 
of the violation, and that is why it is referred to as the expected impact. 
3.6.1.1 Probability of voltage dip violation 
With a measure for the voltage dip magnitude at a load bus h, probability density 
functions /. /,(v,,„) and /,;,(/,.„) are used for the voltage magnitude lower limit and the 
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duration upper limit at bus b, respectively. The probability of the voltage dip being lower 
than the lower limit, regardless of the duration is given by: 
oo 
^ dtp 
The event of load being interrupted at bus b, because of a voltage dip violation in 
magnitude and duration is denoted as the event Kv.b. This event occurs if the voltage 
magnitude remains below the limit long enough to activate the protection relays. This is 
illustrated in Figure 
Vdip 
duration 
Iim 
t 
Figure 3-3. Voltage dip magnitude and duration 
The probability of the event Kv.b given a fault of a specific type occurs at a specific 
location is given by the following expressions: 
Pr(A:,,, I C = c,L. = /. F = = Pr(r > I ) 
Pr(A:, ^ I C = C,4 = /, F = «,,r) = j J /. )/,./, (^.m 
V 0 
The magnitude and duration limits are here assumed to be independent. However, 
strictly speaking, the time that the voltage magnitude remains under a certain level depends 
on this level, which is a random variable. This explains why the upper limit of the second 
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integral has the dependency on the magnitude explicitly indicated. To simplify the 
calculation, the integral upper limit can be assumed dependent from the mean voltage dip 
limit v,.^ instead of the voltage dip limit itself. 
3.6.1.2 Expected impact of voltage dip violation 
If load is interrupted, it is assumed that the load Db at bus b is disconnected. The 
expected impact at bus b is obtained by multiplying the amount of interrupted load with the 
per unit cost Cb of interrupted load and the probability computed with equation 1: 
I C = c,L. = l,F = n,-F)) = Pr(A'^ IC = c,L^ = l,F = -C^ -
This expression emphasizes the fact that the deep)er the voltage dip and the longer the 
violation lasts, the more load will be dropped. Instead of only considering shedding all load 
at a bus at once, the method can be refined by treating at each bus the different load 
categories in different ways considering different pdfs for the limits, as suggested in 
reference [99]. The expected impact over all load buses given the fault, is obtained by 
summing the individual impacts: Kv is now defined as the event where voltage dip violation 
occurred somewhere in the system. 
£ ( I m ( / : ,  I C  =  c , L ,  =  l , F  =  / I . J ) )  =  5 ] ^ E ( I m ( A : , ; , \ C  =  c , L , = l . F  =  n , T ) )  
Finally, the risk of voltage dip violation is computed through the following 
expression: 
'Vi .V 4 
Risk{K^ I x) = £(Im(/r,, I C = c,£^. =/, F =«,.?)) (3-13) 
1=1 /=! /i=l 
3.6.1.3 Overview of the calculation methodology for risk of voltage dip violation 
To summarize the presented algorithm to calculate risk of transient dip violation is 
shown in Figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4. Transient instability risk calculation overview. 
3.7 Summary of the chapter 
In this chapter, the conservativeness of the deterministic transient stability limits is 
illustrated through an example. The complete probability calculation procedure is develojjed 
indicating how fault occurrence, fault type, fault location, fault clearing time and pre-fault 
level uncertainty is included, and the impact of angle instability is quantified. Finally, some 
preliminary work is presented towards a framework to calculate the risk of voltage dip. 
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4. RESULTS ON TEST CASE 
This chapter illustrates the methodology to calculate risk of transient instability 
presented in the previous chapter. An operating scenario within the IEEE RTS '96 test 
system is used for this illustration. 
In section 4.1, the test system is presented and section 4.2 describes the software 
developed for this research. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the parameter values used in 
the risk calculations. Section 4.4 illustrates the influence on the risk uncertainty in fault 
clearing time and load level. Section 4.5 provides examples of how risk levels vary with 
certain operating parameters. 
4.1 Test system 
The test system used in this work is a modified version of the IEEE Reliability test 
system - 1996 [54]. The one-line diagram is shown in Figure 4-1. The modifications from 
the original system are summarized below: 
• Line 11-13 has been taken out for scheduled maintenance. 
• At the bus 23 plant, the 350MW unit has been replaced by a 155 MW unit 
• The fault rate of the line 13-23 has been doubled. 
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BUS 13 230 kV •us 14 
BUS24 BOS 11 •US 12 
138 kV 
Figure 4-1. One-line diagram of the IEEE 24 bus RTS system 
4.2 Developed software 
A  software module was developed to calculate risk for any pre-fault operating 
conditions or any range of operating conditions. The software consists of a main controlling 
batch-fUe monitoring several industry grade software modules: a load flow calculation 
(IPFLOW). and a transient stability simulation program (ETMSP) and its output analyzer 
(OAP)^ 
The software has three parts; 
1. Pre-fault operating conditions: the input file for the risk-calculation module can be set 
and modified through the IPFLOW interface. 
^ EPRI software, on a Hcwiett-Packard C110-9000 125MHz and 64Mb RAM processor 
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2. Risk calculation module: for a desired range of pre-fault conditions, the risk calculation 
algorithm will initiate three cycles, one for all considered faulted lines, one for the 
locations on that line and one for the fault types. For each line/location/type combination, 
the Transient Stability Index is calculated using ETMSP and OAF. 
3. After all cycles are completed, the risk is computed and stored in a file that can be used to 
be plotted with MATLAB or any other graphic tool. 
To obtain the results presented in this work, the early termination method described in 
section 2.1.4 was not applied, because the source code of the simulation software could not 
be changed. Only classical machine models were used. However, the methodology is capable 
of accommodating any type of machine modeling. 
In parallel, a MATLAB prototype with graphical user interface was developed for 
demonstration purposes only, calculating risk of instability. In this case early termination was 
used and a simple trapezoidal numerical integration to solve the differential equations. 
However, it applies only to classical machine modeling. 
4.3 Parameter values for risk calculations 
4.3.1 Probability 
Fault occurrence 
Instability of the plant at Bus 13 can only be caused by faults on either one of the two 
lines emerging from that bus. Table 4-1 gives the probabilities of either line being 
outaged. Faults on the other lines were previously tested and did not cause any instability 
of the units at Bus 13 under any circumstances, and therefore they are not considered 
here. 
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Table 4-1. Occurrence probability of line outages 
Line outage Probability /hr 
13-12 
13-23 
4.58E-5 
9.16E-5 
Fault type 
From historical data, the following probabilities were obtained. Other types of faults 
were not considered, either because their probability of occurrence or severity, or both is 
negligible. 
Table 4-2. Occurrence probability of fault type 
Fault type Probability 
3 phase-to-ground 0.062 
2 phase-to-ground 0.10 
Single phase-to-ground 0.75 
Line-to-line 0.088 
Fault location 
A discrete uniform distribution is adopted where each one of the two lines are divided 
into 10 segments. This means that 11 locations on each line are considered. 
Clearing time 
The fault clearing time is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 0.1 s and 
15% standard deviation. 
Pre-fauit load level 
The one-hour ahead pre-fault load level prediction is assumed to follow a normal 
distribution with the predicted load as mean and with a 2% standard deviation. 
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4.3.2 Impact 
The values of each impact parameters are listed in Table 4-3. The penalties for 
reliability criteria violation and the cost associated with eventual cascading events are not 
included. 
Table 4-3. Impact parameters 
Repair and start-up costs: 
Crep and Cstart 
$36,224 and $45,000 
Outage duration h 10 hrs 
Outage per MWhr cost Cnew 68.5 S/MWhr 
Original per MWhr cost C„id 29.95 $/MWhr 
Load shedding cost Q,,, 1,000 S/MWhr 
4.4 Influence of uncertainties on Risk 
In Table 3-1, the effect of uncertainty on fault occurrence, type and location on the 
generation limit is shown and it was observed that there are highly influential factors 
determining the transient stability performance of a system at a given operating point. Here 
the effect of uncertainty in clearing time and pre-fault load level on generation limits is 
analyzed. To do this, first, the risk of transient instability is plotted versus the generation 
level at plant 13. For this plot, only three uncertainties are considered: occurrence, type and 
location. The level of real power supply of the generator at risk of going unstable is clearly a 
determining factor for the stability. The higher the power output, and thus the mechanical 
torque, the higher the accelerating power during the fault. Subsequently, the unit will go out-
of-step faster when the supply is higher, as shown in Figure 4-2. 
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Risk versus Plant Output at Bus 13 
30 
25 
20 
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Real power output at 8us 13 (MW> 
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Figure 4-2. Generator level unit at risk. 
From the plot, it is shown that with only these three uncertainties, the deterministic 
limit corresponds exactly with the point above which the risk is non-zero. This plot will be 
used as a reference in the next subsections to identify the influence of the uncertainties on the 
risk. 
4.4.1 Uncertain clearing time 
As explained in section 3.3.2.5. the actual fault clearing time can also be considered a 
random variable with an assumed normal distribution around the designed clearing time. The 
error on the clearing is traditionally neglected in the deterministic approaches. 
To evaluate the effect of the clearing time uncertainty on the risk, the 95% confidence 
intervals are plotted next to the original plot shown in Figure 4-2. The result is shown in 
Figure 4-3. The upper curve corresponds to the risk with a designed clearing time plus 2a, 
and minus 2a for the lower curve. It can be seen that the intervals are very wide and, 
therefore, the modeling of this type of uncertainty should not be neglected and should be 
included in the risk calculation. 
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%95 Confidence mterval with uncertain deanng time 
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Real power output at Bus t3 (MW) 
600 
1
Figure 4-3. 95% confidence intervals with 15% uncertainty on the clearing time 
The previous analysis establishes that fault clearing uncertainty can have a significant 
influence on the risk level, and that it consequently must be included in the risk assessment. 
Recalling the method presented in section 3.3.2.4, where the stability index 
(p = f (T.C.L^,F) . We now seek to determine the function/. 
Since there is no way to obtain this ftinction analytically, it can be traced by a series 
of simulations combined with the bisection method, to find the exact clearing time for which 
the stability index becomes zero, i.e., the critical clearing time, Tcc- Once this value has been 
determined, the probability of the index <p being smaller than zero can be calculated by 
(equation 3-7). 
<T, 
As an alternative to the more time consuming method, an approach is proposed that 
approximates the function /, by a piecewise linear function. Many different (p versus r plots 
were obtained corresponding to different fault or operating situations, and some of them are 
presented below. The fault location is changed, the fault type, and a different generation 
levels are applied (Figure 4-4 - Figure 4-7). 
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fi versus deamg time (Tpfiase-near) 
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Figure 4-4. Three phase fault at near-end bus, Pgcn = 6(X)MW 
fi versus dearuig tune (SD^ase-near) 
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Figure 4-5. Single phase fault at near-end bus. Pgen = 6CK)MW 
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fi versus cleanng time (3ptiase-far) 
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Figure 4-6. Three phase fault at far-end bus, Pgen = 6(X)MW 
f> versus cfeanng time (3p^ase-near-iow load 
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Figure 4-7. Three phase fault at near end bus, Pgen = 540 MW 
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From the four figures it can be seen that the curves can be approximated by a 
piecewise linear function. The function is monotonically decreasing such that the inverse of/ 
can be defined as required in equation 3-7. Certain rules can be extracted from these plots: 
the comer points are always close to (p values of 2 and -2, and the slopes of the linear parts 
are also approximately constant. The approximated curve is illustrated in Figure 4-8: the 
shape of the curve is assumed constant, but its horizontal position is not known and depends 
solely on the (p value associated with the adopted clearing time. 
2 
0 
.0 
Tccl T = 0.1 ^ 
Figure 4-8. Approximated function between (p and r 
In order to calculate the probability o f  ( p  <  0 ,  the probability of instability, the 
following steps are executed: 
1. The (p corresponding to a clearing time of t = 0.1 is found, through transient 
stability assessment, according to the method presented in section 2.1.4. 
2. Using the approximated function, shown in Figure 4-8, the critical clearing 
time Ted is found. It corresponds to the clearing time for which (p is equal to 
zero (stability boundary). Ted is the lower bound (/~'(^ = 0)) of the integral 
in equation 3-7. 
3. Finally, the result of the integral given in equation 3-7 is calculated and 
returns the requested probability value. 
48 
Error of approximation 
The probability of instability error incurred by the adopted approximation for each 
one of the four cases presented in Figure 4-4 to Figure 4-7 is shown in 
Table 4-4. The table shows that the errors in these cases are fairly small. However, 
the closer a case is to the stability boundary, the higher the approximation error will be. 
Nonetheless, it is believed to be a good enough to enable a rapid risk calculation. Figure 4-9 
illustrates the effect of including the clearing time uncertainty on the risk. The dashed line is 
the original curve from Figure 4-2, with no clearing time uncertainty. From the Figure 4-10, 
it can be seen that for a range of about 40MW below the detenninistic limit, the risk is small, 
but not completely zero. This shows that deterministic limit (at 470 MW) is not always 
conservative. In fact it can also be unsafe, as shown here. 
Table 4-4. Probability of instability approximation error 
Estimated Correct % error 
Three phase at close-end bus 1.000 1.000 0 
Single phase at close-end bus 0.843 0.816 3.21 
Three phase at far-end bus 0.982 0.985 0.22 
Three phase near, lower generation 1.000 0.9999999 neal. 
4.4.2 Uncertain load level 
In this subsection the effect of pre-fault load level uncertainty on the risk is analyzed. 
A time horizon of one hour is used, for which it is usual to assume a 2% load level standard 
deviation. As explained in section 3.3.2.5, the worst-case scenario will be tested First, using a 
correlation factor of the loads among the buses equal to one. If the influence turns out to be 
minor, it indicates that the load uncertainty is not a factor when calculating the risk of 
transient instability in an operating environment. If the influence is relevant, a more detailed 
modeling of the load uncertainty needs to be adopted. Figure 4-11 is the same as the risk 
versus generation level depicted in Figure 4-3, but this time the 95% confidence interval [-
2a/+2a] is shown corresponding to the 2% 
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Risk versus Plant Output at Bus 13 
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Figure 4-9. Influence of clearing time uncertainty on risk 
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Figure 4-10. Influence of clearing time uncertainty on risk (zoom-in from the previous 
figure) 
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standard deviation of the total load. This plot provides an indication of how important or 
negligible this particular uncertainty really is. The dashed line corresponds to the original risk 
curve with the load level equal to the predicted load level. The solid lines are the -2a and the 
+2a risk curves respectively. 
From Figure 4-11, it can be concluded that the 2% load uncertainty does not cause any 
significant impact on the risk calculations, since the %95 confidence interval is very narrow. 
Therefore, the load can be considered known for a one-hour ahead risk evaluation procedure. 
Confidence tntefval vwtft uncertain toad 
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Figure 4-11. 95% confidence interval with uncertain load 
4.5 Influence of operating parameters on Transient Instability Risk 
In this section, risk is computed for variation in specific operating conditions within a 
range. The goals are to illustrate how the risk might be usefiilly portrayed to an operator and 
to establish that the risk variation reflects variation in system stress levels. The uncertainties 
that have been modeled are: fault rate, fault type, fault location and fault clearing time. 
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4.5.1 Local load 
A local load is connected at bus 13. which is also the bus with the plant at-risk. The 
load is increased while all other parameters are kept constant, except the generation at Bus 21 
which is used to compensate for the change of load. As Figure 4-12 shows, risk decreases as 
the load at Bus 13 is increased. 
For a given generation level at Bus 13, a part of this power will be used to supply this 
local load. The rest will flow to the system. If the load increases, a larger share of the 
generation will be used to supply the local load, and less will be sent to the lines, i.e., the 
lines will be less loaded. As a result, the faulted lines will be off-loaded when the indicated 
load and compensating generation increases. It is observed that the rotor angle in the case of 
the larger load value is actually smaller than in the case of a smaller local load value. As a 
result, the generator will easierly go unstable when local load is small, and vice versa. 
Risk versus Load at Bus 13 
80 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 
Load at Bus 13 (MW) 
Figure 4-12. Local load level. 
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4.5.2 Total load and total generation 
The next plot is to illustrate the effect of the dispatch policy on the risk of transient 
instability. In Figure 4-2, the dispatch policy was to compensate the change in the plant 
output by a change at generator 21. Now, in this case, (Figure 4-13) the total system load is 
changing uniformly, compensated by a uniform change of all generator outputs throughout 
the system^. It can be seen that both plots are very similar, indicating that the dispatch does 
not have a significant influence on the risk value. 
Risk versus Plant Output at Bus 13 - wrth total load cf^ artge 
20 
420 460 500 440 480 
Real power output at Bus 13 (MW) 
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Figure 4-13. Proportional total load and total generation variation 
4.5.3 Voltage level generator terminals 
When changing the voltage set point of the generator. Figure 4-14 shows that the risk 
for instability decreases as the terminal voltage increases. This is understandable since with 
lower voltage levels, the accelerating power is smaller, and therefore, the chance for 
instability increases. 
^ The changcs in load and generator level arc done through a multiplication factor. 
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Risk versus voftage setpcvit at Bus 13 
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Figure 4-14. voltage level generator terminals 
4.5.4 Generation level neighboring plant 
Here, the effect of the generation of a neighboring (30 mi) plant power output is 
investigated (Figure 4-15). As expected, the influence is much smaller than in the previous 
case, but it is still perceptible. 
Risk versus Plant Outout at Bus 23 
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Figure 4-15. Generator level neighboring unit. 
p
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4.6 Summary of the chapter 
The objective of this chapter is to give results of transient instability risk calculations 
obtained on a test system. First, it is tested whether the uncertainties of parameters discussed 
in the chapter 3 really have an influence on the risk calculation. The results show that the 
fault clearing time error should not be neglected since it has a significant effect on the 
stability. The one-hour ahead pre-fault load level prediction error, however, is not relevant in 
the risk calculations. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to visualize the effect of some other 
parameters on the risk. In particular, the generation level of the plant at risk is a crucial 
factor. It also demonstrated with the risk approach, that the deterministic operating limits do 
not correspond to risk level equal to zero. 
55 
5. FAST RISK ASSESSMENT 
In order to have a tool that can be useful and practical in an operation environment, it 
should meet the minimum performance requirements in terms of speed and accuracy. In fact 
these requirements are in direct conflict with each other. In a planning environment, high 
accuracy is a higher priority than speed: there is not really a pressure to get a rapid answer. 
In an operation environment, however, speed is probably at least as important as the 
accuracy. In a pre-contingency selection, where a large number of contingencies are 
screened, speed is favored over accuracy. Later, with the subset of 'dangerous* 
contingencies, the assessment is repeated, but this time with higher accuracy. 
In order to evaluate the risk of transient instability in an operation environment, the 
assessment procedure must be fast. In the risk assessment procedure developed in section 
3.3.2. the number of transient stability assessments to be performed can become very large. 
For example, when two lines are found to be critical, with these lines divided into 10 
segments, and 4 fault types are considered, the risk value of one operating point requires 
2x10x4 = 80 stability assessments. In chapter 2, an index was presented to measure 
numerically the level of transient stability. This index allows automating the complete 
simulation procedure. Still, the number of simulations to perform remains the same. The 
problem gets even more serious when risk-based nomograms introduced in chapter 1 are 
considered: in order to obtain a sufficiently high accuracy the number of operating points in 
the nomogram for which the risk is calculated should be at least 150. At 80 stability 
assessments per operating point, the number of the number of stability assessments can 
exceed 12,000 for single nomograms. To have these risk-based nomograms updated several 
times during the day, it is essential to find efficient ways to calculate the risk. 
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This chapter is dedicated to suggesting ways to reduce the number of time domain 
simulations to perform, or to propose alternatives to these simulations. In section 5.2, several 
rules are discussed to decrease the number of redundant simulations. Section 5.3 proposes an 
alternative to the time consuming simulations by using artificial intelligent techniques, with 
special emphasis on Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). Finally, section 5.4 provides an 
overview of all possible speed enhancements. 
5.1 Reducing the number of transient stability assessments 
5.1.1 Predictable cases 
A large number of transient stability assessments (TSI calculations) can be avoided 
when making the following two assumptions: 
1. When the system remains stable after a three-phase fault at the terminals with 
clearing of a single line (worst case), faults of other types and on locations further 
away from the generator will be stable. Faults on that line will not contribute to 
any risk. 
2. When a single-phase fault at the far end of a circuit (opposite to the generator bus, 
i.e., best case), results in instability, any other fault at any other location will also 
result in instability. Again, no other assessments are needed. Faults on that line 
contribute highly to risk. 
In some cases, one or both assumptions made above are not valid. It has been shown 
in [45] that in some occasions, the stability may worsen with increasing distance from the 
generator terminals. According to the author, the capability of the exciter to enhance the 
stability behavior degrades as the fault is moved further from the generator. This is 
particularly true when the generator employs a fast, high initial response exciter. 
In any case, these assumptions should be carefully checked before applying them. 
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5.1.2 Location search algorithm 
If a fault of a specific type, applied at two ends of one line returns different signs for 
the transient stability index, a binary search algorithm can be used to find what the 
percentage is of the line where faults can cause instability. If the signs are equal, no other 
assessments are required and another type of fault can be applied. 
This kind of reasoning, when valid, is likely to avoid a large number of unnecessary 
stability assessments. 
This speed improvement technique, as well as the previous one. can only be used if 
only the sign of the stability index is of interest. As explained in chapters 3 and 4, if the fault 
clearing time is included in the model as a random variable, also the magnitude of the 
stability index is required. 
5.1.3 Screening of faulted lines 
The number of lines on which a fault can cause any machine to go out-of-step is 
usually limited. Therefore, an off-line screening is necessary to filter out those lines that do 
not cause any trouble even under very stressed conditions. Some well-established 
methodologies could be used for this purpose [55]. In the test system used, only two relevant 
lines were observed. This screening should be repeated for different topologies. 
5.2 Use of Neural Network in Transient Stability Assessment 
As explained in the above sections, the time consuming part of the algorithm is the 
transient stability assessment. This assessment can be characterized as a non-linear mapping 
from a large input vector (pre-fault operating state and fault conditions) to a single output 
value (the transient stability index). An alternative to the slow time domain simulations is the 
use of artificial intelligence to predict the TSI from the input vector. In this section, it is 
shown that this task can be done by artificial neural networks (ANN). Reference [56] 
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provides more details about the concept of ANN, while reference [57] discusses neural 
network applications in power systems. 
In a very general way, ANN can be defined as a highly interconnected array of nodes, 
similar to the neuron structure in a human brain. The nodes (or neurons) have an activation 
function and are organized in different layers. The input vector is fed into the input layer, and 
the output is obtained at the output layer, with possibly several hidden layers in between. The 
neurons of the different layers are connected through weights. With the traditional back 
propagation algorithm, the training of an ANN consists in finding the weights by feeding it 
one by one, a large number of input vectors with an associated output and back propagating 
the error made by the ANN on the output. 
5.2.1 Literature 
The combination of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques and power system security 
assessment is far fi-om new. Techniques that had been used in signal and image processing 
made their entrance in the world of power systems some 30 years ago. It became clear that 
tools were needed to rapidly identify the operating limits in order to avoid operating in the 
insecure, and to allow operating closer to the boundary resulting in more efficient use of the 
available generation and transmission infrastructure. The main challenge was and still is to 
reconcile two inherently adverse aspects of the assessment: the speed and the accuracy. The 
primary objective has been to use these fast assessment techniques to fdter quickly a large 
number of contingencies that pose no stability problems. The few remaining contingencies 
could be analyzed in more detail using the slower, but more accurate time domain simulation. 
Pattern recognition (PR) was the first AI method to be applied to dynamic security 
assessment. In reference [58] Pang et al. suggested the use of PR for classification purposes. 
A pattern classifier is trained off-line using the results obtained from time domain simulation. 
The objective is to quickly classify an operating state as transiently 'stable' or 'unstable'. 
Reference [59] was a milestone in the use of AI in dynamic security assessment: in 
this paper, Sobajic and Pao suggested the use of ANN to predict the critical clearing time 
from a reduced input vector including information about the fault location, pre-fault 
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operating point, and protective relaying strategy. Since then, a large variety of ANN 
applications in dynamic security assessment has emerged. Many of them include small 
improvements with respect to reference [59] or combine ANN with other techniques [60]-
[62]. An overview of ANN applications in dynamic security assessment (DSA) is given in 
[63], where also the capabilities and limitations of ANN in DSA are discussed. 
The use of rule-based expert systems for this purpose has also been proposed. The 
major weakness of this method is the fact that they are very case dependent, or in other 
words, their ability to generalize is very limited [64]. Decision trees are usually labeled as an 
AI method applied to can also be applied to fast transient stability assessment but is also 
often categorized as a special type of expert system. Here decision rules are provided by an 
inductive inference method. While the success of the decision trees has been demonstrated in 
different papers, it has not sparked as much interest as the ANN method. 
Some authors have been suggesting the combination of different AI techniques in 
order to develop a method bundling the good features of the individual techniques. In 
reference [66]. Song et al. combine pattern recognition with neural networks for transient 
stability assessment. Another example of this is given in reference [67] where Pe^as Lopes et 
al. use kernel regression trees, consisting of a combination of kernel regressors and decision 
trees. 
The reasons why ANNs are very popular in fast transient or dynamic security 
assessment applications are; 
• Prediction of performance index values (stability margin, transient stability index, 
critical clearing time, frequency deviation, etc.) by ANN is very fast, 
• As a non-linear mapping tool, ANN has excellent generalization capabilities, 
• The sensitivity of the TSI with respect to the input vector can be estimated 
directly from the weights. 
• By keeping a knowledge base, using previous operating points, the ANN can be 
easily updated. 
For the needs of the work described in this dissertation, ANN were selected to map 
the pre-fault operating conditions into the transient stability index presented in chapter 2. In 
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addition to the aforementioned reasons, it should be said that a trained neural network can 
also easily be integrated in the risk calculation software. It was not in the scope of this 
research to investigate very deeply all-possible AI techniques that could be applied to this 
problem, but simply to show that one of the most common applied techniques, the ANN. 
improves significantly the speed characteristics of the risk calculation procedure presented in 
chapter 3. making it useable in a operation environment. 
5.3 Creating an ANN to predict the transient stability index 
The creation of a neural network comprises several stages that are explained in this 
section. The stages are: 
• Training and test set generation 
• Feature selection 
• Training and test process 
5.3.1 Training and test set generation 
In fact, this is an important stage independently of which artificial intelligence 
technique is being used. UUimately, the neural network performance depends totally on the 
information that is contained in the data set. Therefore, it is crucial that the set has the 
following characteristics: 
• High resolution 
• Good distribution 
• Sufficient breadth of information 
A software tool was developed called "automated transient stability assessment 
software" or ATS AS to create large data sets with the above-mentioned characteristics in an 
automated fashion, not requiring the intervention of the analyst. It produces data files or data 
sets with a large number of samples. All samples of each file correspond to different pre-fault 
operating points to which the same type of fault is applied and on one of the circuits. The 
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data are built such that each row corresponds to a sample or an operating point described by 
the values of the operating variables together with the resulting transient stability index, 
obtained through simulation. 
ANNs are known to be excellent in non-linear interpolation but have a worse 
performance in extrapolation. Therefore, it is important to generate data that captures the 
breadth of the complete feasible operating range. Attempts to use the neural network outside 
this operating range will result in diminished accuracy. 
In the next two subsections (5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2) it is explained how to obtain the 
desired characteristics of the training set mentioned earlier. First, it is necessary to classify 
certain pre-contingency operating parameters according to different groups. 
5.3.1.1 Critical pre-contingency parameters (CPPs) 
Some pre-contingency operating parameters are expected to be good predictors of the 
performance measure. This is equivalent to saying that they are expected to be influential 
with respect to the transient stability behavior of the system. They can be any operating 
parameter that can be monitored in the control room and are typically selected through 
experience and by physical understanding of the security problem. The engineer should 
overselect in choosing the CPPs; if there is a doubt about whether a parameter should be a 
CPP or not. then it should be included as a CPP. 
Another sub classification is made by distinguishing independent from dependent 
CPPs. Independent CPPs are typically inputs of the power flow calculation (active generation 
levels, voltage setpoints, load level, etc.) while dependent CPPs are the results of a power 
flow calculation. 
5.3.1.2 Sample generation 
Next, the samples are created according to a systematic procedure. From the set of 
independent CPPs, a small subset is chosen of CPPs with the highest expected influence on 
the stability response of the system. The parameters included in this subset are designated as 
the Monte Carlo CPPs (MCPPs) for reasons that will become clear later. The number of 
MCPPs defines the dimensions of the hyperspace from where the samples will be taken. 
The complete operating range of each one of the MCPPs is divided into equal-sized 
intervals. Consequently, the hyperspace can be seen as being divided into smaller hypercells 
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having dimension corresponding to the length of the intervals. The sampling procedure 
consists of a step-by-step advancement through the hyperspace, and a sample data point is 
obtained for each hypercell. 
The next step is to decide where in each cell to sample. One simple approach would 
be to sample the center of each hypercell or a specific comer of the cell. A two-dimensional 
example is shown in Figure 5-1. This approach guarantees a uniform distribution of sampled 
data points, but not necessarily a high resolution. 
An alternative way to sample is presented in Figure 5-2. Instead of taking fixed points 
in each ceil, a sample data point is chosen randomly within each cell. This method, referred 
to in this work as Monte Carlo sampling, leads to a highly resolved data set, because many 
different values of the parameters will be present in the set. This approach is motivated by 
the assumption that neural network accuracy, for a given number of data sample points, is 
best when each parameter is maximally resolved. In the literature, this method is also referred 
to as the latin hypercube sampling [69, pp. 553-555]. 
After the selection of the MCPPs, the values of the other CPPs need to be assigned 
their values at each sample data point. Depending on the nature of the parameter, this value 
can be chosen randomly over the operating range of this parameter. 
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Figure 5-1. Structured sampling in two dimensions. 
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Figure 5-2. Monte Carlo sampling in two dimensions 
Once the values for all CPPs are specified in a hypercell. the simulation is performed, 
starting with a power flow solution to determine the pre-fault operating conditions, followed 
by a time domain simulation and stability index calculation. Finally, the parameter values 
and the index are stored in the data file and the procedure advances to a new hypercube. 
This method guarantees a good distribution and high resolution, if the number of 
segments is high enough. As mentioned before, to obtain enough breadth of the information 
contained in the data set. the operating values of the parameters should cover the complete 
feasible range. The complete sample generation algorithm is presented in Figure 5-3 and is 
based on the method described [70]. 
The software that has been developed to create the data set, monitors the input and the 
output of several simulation routines, (power flow calculation and the transient stability 
assessment) and performs the transient stability index calculation. 
Before starting the data generation program it is also necessary to consider the time 
allocated for this generation procedure. The required generation time depends directly on the 
number of hypercells in which the hyperspace has been divided. Therefore, to obtain a data 
set with a good enough accuracy within a reasonable amount of time, a higher number of 
intervals should be chosen for MCPPs with an expected important influence on the post-fault 
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Figure 5-3. Automated transient stability assessnvent. 
system behavior. In addition, the number of MCPPs should be limited depending on the 
speed of the available computer. 
5.3.2 Feature selection 
As was mentioned in 5.3.1, the objective is to overselect the parameters 
characterizing a sample data point in order to ensure no relevant information is missing in the 
final data set. Ultimately, this parameter or feature set will be used as an input to an ANN, 
and the output will be the transient stability index, using the data in the file to train and test 
the ANN. On the other hand, an excessively large set of features might have some 
drawbacks: 
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• The larger the feature set, the slower the ANN learning process, 
• Some of the features are hardly or not relevant and will introduce some noise in 
the information, which will diminish the accuracy, 
• More samples are needed if the feature set is large, in order to obtain a sufficiently 
accurate ANN. 
For these reasons, it is necessary to find a smaller subset of features that does not 
contain redundant information and that performs best in predicting the ANN output. This 
subsection describes an approach to automatically select the most critical parameters or 
features. It is important to mention here, that this selection is not meant to replace the 
engineering judgment, but to confirm it and to complement it by giving additional 
information. 
In this work, a genetic algorithm is used to search the possible combinations of 
features and to come up with a list of subsets that perform well as neural network inputs, A 
neural net-based genetic algorithm was used to select this subset of features. Only the major 
points of this technique will be discussed in this work, more details can be found in [71]. 
5.3.2.1 Genetic algorithms (GAs) 
A good definition of what genetic algorithms are can be found in reference [73] where 
the author states: "Genetic algorithms are search algorithms based on the mechanics of 
natural selection and natural genetics". GAs are especially usefiil to search for solutions in 
combinatorial problems with discrete solutions for which a performance measure (a.k.a. 
fitness ) can be defined for each solution. 
The GA process works as follows: an initial population (or group) of binary bit 
strings is created randomly. This is also called the first generation. Each string of ones and 
zeros corresponds to one solution. Depending of the application, the binary coding of the 
solution can have very different meanings. To evaluate the worth of each solution according 
to the criteria of the problem, a fitness fiinction needs to be defined that will return the 
"fitness" of each solution. 
In order to evolve to the next generation, the population needs to undergo several 
operations; reproduction, crossover, and mutation. Many variations of these operations have 
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been developed. In the reproduction phase, the fitness is used to measure the ability of a 
solution to survive and to be present in the next generation. Crossover and mutation consists 
in trying to introduce new genetic material in the population, with the hope that newer and 
better solutions, i.e. with better fitness, will emerge. 
The algorithm continues to evolve through a large number of generations until the 
population does not improve anymore. 
5.3.2.2 GA application to feature selection 
An exhaustive search for the optimal subset of features to be used as an input for a 
ANN to predict the transient stability index is generally not feasible due the usually high 
number of pre-selected features^. As mentioned before, in this work, GAs are used to 
determine a selection of quasi optimal subsets. The idea to use genetic algorithms for feature 
selection has been suggested, among others by Vafaie et al. in [72]. The software package 
GANN, developed at Iowa State University, was used for this purpose. 
In this application, each solution is represented by a binary vector consisting of a 
number of bits equal to the number of pre-selected features. Each position in the string 
corresponds to a feature or attribute. A '1' on a certain position means that that feature will 
be used as an input feature, while a '0' indicates that it will not t)e used. To compare the 
solutions or the individuals of the population it is necessary to evaluate their performance; a 
fitness function has to be defined. The fitness ftinction used in GANN combines two aspects, 
accuracy and cardinality. The total fitness F is given by equation 5-1. 
F = VV| F, -f- \v\ F (5-1) 
• Accuracy fitness F/ 
A small neural network is trained using the inputs corresponding to the selected 
features of the individual. Accuracy fitness is measured by the reciprocal of the 
average absolute error computed by testing the neural network. 
^ With 30 prc-sclccted features, then number of combinations will be 2^°= 1.073.741,824 
67 
• Cardinality fitness F2 
Cardinality is the number of features that are selected in the individual, i.e., it is the 
number of Ts present in the solution. A desired number of cardinality is sjjecified 
and if a solution contains more selected features than the desired cardinality, the 
cardinality fitness will be zero. Otherwise, Fz will be equal to the number of features 
present in the solution. 
The weight W2 is usually very large compared to wi. The Multi-layer Back 
propagation neural network is used because of its computational efficiency and its ability to 
perform nonlinear functional approximation. In order to limit computation time, a simple 
neural network structure with only one neuron in one hidden layer is used. In this work it is 
assumed that the feature set that performs best with this simple structure will be at least one 
of the best for more complicated structures. 
5.3.3 Training & testing of Neural Network 
After obtaining the satisfactory subset of critical pre-contingency operating 
parameters, a neural network is trained with this subset as input to predict the transient 
stability index. The multi-layer back propagation neural network model is used. The data set 
is divided into a training and a test set. The test set is not used to train the ANN but is fed 
into the trained ANN to evaluate its generalization capabilities. 
It still has to be specified which ANN architecture to be adopted. Several heuristic 
methods have been suggested in the literature. As a general rule it can be said that if the 
structure is too simple the training error wUl be large. The training error is the error of the 
ANN when using the data samples of the training set only. If the structure is too complicated 
the learning error will be small enough but the generalization capabilities will be limited, 
resulting in large test errors. The 'optimal' structure can be found through trial and error. 
Instead of the traditional back propagation algorithm with fixed and unique learning 
rate, an adaptive back propagation is used, with an individual adaptive learning rate for each 
weight. The learning process with this algorithm is much faster [61]. 
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Once the ANN has been trained, the ANN is implemented in the risk calculation 
module by rebuilding it according to the optimal architecture and the obtained weights. 
This work does not claim to employ the most advanced NN technology. Many newer, 
and probably more efficient algorithms have been developed in the recent years. The only 
objective of this chapter is to show that even with a 'conventional' ANN it is possible to 
considerably speeding up the risk calculation process by predicting the transient stability 
index from the pre-fault operating conditions. 
5.4 Illustration 
As explained in chapter I. many utilities operate their system with the help of a set of 
nomograms to indicate them the deterministic operating limits in the space of 2 critical 
operating parameters. As an alternative to these deterministic limits, it is proposed to plot in 
the same space, the contours of equal risk. In order to do this with a sufficient accuracy, the 
risk value of a large number of points needs to be computed. The contours will be drawn by 
interpolating through these points. 
The computational intensity of the risk calculation has been identified in this work as 
a difficulty. This problem is even more severe when considering risk-based nomograms. The 
nomograms should be updated ideally every 15 or 30 min. It is for this application that 
artificial neural networks are very useful, as will be shown in this section. 
The objective is to draw contours for the previously presented case taken fi"om the 
IEEE RTS system, where faults on two lines leaving bus 13 can cause transient instability at 
the plant at Bus 13. The two critical parameters selected for the abscissa and ordinate of the 
nomogram are the load level and the generation level at bus 13, respectively. It is estimated 
that the risk value of approximately 200 operating points in the space of these two parameters 
needs to be calculated in order to obtain a graph with sufficient accuracy. 
The problem was approached the following way: the two lines and the 4 fault types 
correspond to 8 different events, because they are really distinct phenomena. As a result, 
eight data sets were created, one for each event. These eight data sets are then used to train 
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and test eight different neural networks predicting the stability index. When the training and 
testing phases are completed the ANN are incorporated into the risk calculation software. 
Learning and test set 
Using the software described above, eight data sets were created with over 5.000 
samples each. 
Feature selection 
After running the GANN software and using engineering judgment, the 12 attributes 
were selected to represent the input of the neural network, as listed in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1. Selected features for ANN training 
Selected Features 
Individual active power levels of the 3 units at Bus 13 
Total active power level at Bus 23 
Total active power level at Bus 23 
Load at Bus 13 
Active power level unit 2 at Bus 15 
Active power level unit 2 at Bus 2 
Active power level unit 3 at Bus 1 
Flow through faulted line 
System power factor 
Fault location (number of segnrtent on faulted line) 
•This is to indicate which units or "on" or "ofT. The units of one plant that are operating are assumed to have 
the sanx; generation level. 
Due to the high number of samples, the GANN feature selection process was very 
slow. One of the possible problems that can occur while using GAs, is that the algorithm can 
be stuck in a local minimum. To avoid this, several GA runs were performed each team with 
different settings for the GA parameters (initial population size, mutation and crossover 
probability, etc.). From each one of these runs the top 20 best solutions were extracted for 
closer evaluation and comparison with solutions from other runs. 
Training and testing 
The data sets are randomly divided into training sets (70% of the samples) and test 
sets (30%). After several trials, in most cases the best architecture was found to be one with 2 
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hidden layers: with 10 and 8 hidden neurons, respectively and in one case, 8 and 6 neurons, 
respectively. Again, due to the large number of samples, the training process was rather slow. 
5.4.1.1 Visualization of contours of equal risk 
In order to plot these contours, the risk value of 200 points in a grid in the diagram is 
calculated. First, the exact risk values are calculated by determining the transient stability 
index through time domain simulation. These calculations provide a reference will to 
compare the accuracy of the neural network. The contours using those reference calculations 
are displayed in Figure 5-4. These plots are computationally intensive to obtain because the 
dependent CPPs require updating each time the independent CPPs are changed. 
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Figure 5-4. Risk-based nomograms obtained with time domain simulation 
The same graphs are plotted in Figure 5-5, but this time with the eight trained neural 
networks. The speed gain obtained is impressive. While Figure 5-4 is obtained in 
approximately 18 hours on a 125MHz, 64Mb RAM processor. Figure 5-5 only takes about 45 
minutes. The accuracy of the risk values obtained with ANN is about 1.8 S/hr in average. It is 
observed that the accuracy is higher for larger risk values than for smaller ones. This might 
have to do with the fact that the learning sets did not have sufficient low risk points, the 
nsk = 3 
nsk - 1 -5 
nsk = 1 
nsk = 0.5 
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These results could further be improved by investigating on the other possible architectures, 
and applying more sophisticated feature selection algorithms. When the selected neural 
network inputs are all independent variables (loads, generation, voltage set points, etc.), the 
nomogram is plotted in only a few minutes, but at the cost of an even lower accuracy. The 
speed enhancement here is achieved because the updating of the dependent CPPs is avoided. 
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Figure 5-5. Risk-based nomograms obtained with ANN. 
5.5 Overview of possible ways to improve speed of risk calculation 
The following table presents an overview of the different techniques available to 
reduce to computational effort of the risk calculation procedure. If all these techniques were 
applied to it, the procedure and the plotting of risk-based nomogram plotting is expected to 
be feasible in an on-line environment. 
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Table 5-2. Overview speed improvement techniques 
Method How is time reduced Description Implemented? 
Predictable cases eliminates unnecessary 
stability assessments 
In some cases sign of 
stability index can be 
predicted from previous 
stability assessments 
YES 
location search eliminates unnecessary 
stability assessments 
Fraction of the line is 
determined where a 
specific fault causes no 
trouble 
YES 
screening of faulted lines eliminates unnecessary 
stability assessments 
Eliminates lines where 
faults will cause no 
trouble 
YES 
Early termination reduces the simulation 
time 
•As soon as the transient 
(in)stability is detected 
the simulation is 
interrupted 
YES 
artificial intelligence Fast AI prediction instead 
of stability assessments 
Use of ANN to predict 
stability index from 
operating conditions 
YES 
parallel programming simultaneous stability 
assessments 
Parallel processing can be 
done by fault type, fault 
location, or by dividing 
the range of the 
nomogram parameters 
NO 
5.6 Summary of the chapter 
In this chapter special attention was given to the problem of relieving the 
computational effort inherent to the risk calculation. Several rules are suggested to diminish 
the number of time domain simulations to perform. 
In addition, it is proposed to use artificial neural networks as an alternative for the 
time domain simulations. The neural network can be trained to predict the transient stability 
index. After discussing the several phases of the neural network training, including training 
set generation, feature selection, and the actual neural net training, the usefulness of this 
approach is illustrated with the plotting of risk-based nomograms. It is shown that the use of 
neural networks provides significant time gains when used to predict the stability index 
instead of calculating the index fi-om time domain simulations. 
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6. RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING 
In the previous chapters, the focus was on developing a methodology to calculate risk 
of transient instability, particularly how it can be derived and how the associated 
computational intensive procedure can be alleviated. In addition, different ways to visualize 
the risk were presented. 
So far. little was said about how this risk measure can be used. The merit of a security 
index can be even more emphasized, if its usefulness in different applications can be shown. 
In this chapter, it is shown how risk can be used in an operation decision-making framework, 
where risk is one of the attributes of the decision problem. Although the discussion is 
confined to risk of transient instabUity. it is generally applicable to other security problems as 
well such as overload and voltage insecurity [10][n][13]. 
6.1 Problem description 
On many occasions, an engineer faces the problem of having to make decisions of 
various kinds with various levels of possible consequences. The use of a rational decision aid 
tool is most important when the decision-maker is under psychological stress due to time 
constraints, situational complexity, and high cost consequences for poor decisions. Such a 
tool uses as much as possible the available information to help the engineer make the 'best' 
decision, or at least the most defendable. Power system planning engineers deal with 
decision-making problems, such as having to select a specific type of new equipment, the 
location of new substations, choosing possible expansion projects, etc. 
In system operation the decisions need to be made in a very short amount of time 
(maximum a few hours). The problems can be complex too, and the consequences of a wrong 
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decision can be felt immediately. Usually, the number of alternatives available to the system 
operator is limited. As a result, decision aid tools are also very helpful in an operation 
environment. The thrust of this chapter is to pose the decision problem faced by the operators 
and to report on investigations into various solution approaches. Some necessary terminology 
is defined in the next section to begin this discussion. 
6.2 General model of a decision problem 
A decision-making problem has generally the following components: 
• Criteria: higher-level, sometin>es abstract goals, like for example, maximizing 
community welfare, or minimizing criminality, or maximizing customer 
satisfaction. A problem can have different criteria, often one conflicting with 
another, resulting in a multiple criteria decision-making problem. 
• Decision maker (DM): this can be one person or a group of people who have the 
responsibility and the authority to make the decision. 
• Alternatives: a certain number of choices are available to the decision maker, 
called alternatives, actions, or options. If the number is infinite or uncountable, 
then the problem is an optimization problem, which is a specific type of decision 
problem that is not covered in this chapter. The way these alternatives are created 
wiU not be discussed here either, and it is therefore assumed that the different 
alternatives have been specified previously and are known to the DM. 
• Attributes: in order to evaluate the level of satisfaction of an alternative for a 
particular criterion, one or more measures are needed. 
• Objectives: the objective is the direction (minimizing or maximizing) in which 
the DM wants to shift the value of an attribute. An objective is more specific than 
a criterion. A criterion can involve several objectives. For example, 'maximizing 
community welfare' is a criterion that includes several objectives. Community 
welfare can be measured by a number of attributes, such as unemployment rate, 
the number of green area acres, the number of people living on social welfare, etc. 
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The associated objectives correspond to minimizing or maximizing the value of 
the attributes. 
• Future scenarios or states of nature: in many situations, the success (or failure) 
of the alternative depends on the future scenario. The attribute values of each one 
of the alternatives can be different depending on which scenario turns out to be 
true. If only one scenario can happen, the problem is called decision-making 
under certainty. With more than one scenario, the problem is defined as decision­
making under uncertainty. In this case the likelihoods of the scenarios need to be 
specified by analyzing historical data or by the input of experts. 
Though these definitions are found most frequently in the literature, they are not used 
universally. Nevertheless, they will be employed consistently throughout this work. 
6.3 Study case 
The decision maker (DM) is assumed to be in charge of the generator plant in a 3-bus 
subsystem or area of the IEEE reliability test system comprising Buses 12.13 and 23 (see 
4.1), and he/she is in charge of selecting an operating action for the coming hours. 
Table 6-1 presents the options available to the system operator, together with a 
qualitative description of each one of them in terms of security and profits. The DM's goals 
are mainly two-fold: to maximize the profits and to maximize the security. 
In Table 6-2. the probabilities corresponding to each one of the relevant fijture 
scenarios are given. It may happen that no faults occur, or that either one of the two lines 
emerging from Bus 13 is faulted. Only the transient stability is considered, in this case. Other 
faults might also happen in the sub-system under study but do not affect the transient 
stability. 
To measure the economic benefits of an alternative, the projected profits that result 
from that alternative are calculated. It is calculated as the difference between the revenues 
from energy sales and the direct production costs (fuel costs). These profits are shown in 
Table 6-3. This calculation is made assuming no fault occurs. The costs caused by a fault are 
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Table 6-1. Decision making case 
Description Security Profits 
Action I Maintain present conditions. Low Medium 
Action 2 Transfer 60 MW from bus 13 to bus 23 High Medium 
Action 3 Buy 150 MW from outside the area High Low 
Action 4 Sell 130 MW to the outside Low High 
Table 6-2. Probability of fault occurrence. 
Scenarios Probability/hr 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
No outages 
Line outage 13-12 
Line outage 13-23 
0.9999 
4.58E-5 
9.16E-5 
Table 6-3. Profits. 
action I action 2 action 3 action 4 
Frofits(S/hr) 20.385 19.902 10.602 22,595 
Table 6-4. Security Cost. 
$/iir action I action 2 action 3 action 4 
Seen. 1 0 0 0 0 
Seen.2 855.679 235,549 220.111 1,127,882 
Seen.3 671.221 133,461 133.461 671,221 
accounted for in security costs ( 
Table 6-4). These costs differ for each action and under each scenario. They include, repair 
costs, load shedding cost, and opportunity costs [75]. Given this information, the task of the 
plant operator is to find out which one of the options, according to his/her experience and 
judgment, gives the best trade-off between economy and security. 
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6.4 Profits minus Risk - the single criterion case 
If there is only one relevant criterion or if different criteria can be easily combined 
into one single criterion, the problem can be approached by single criterion decision-making 
methods. The differences among the various existing methods are related to the way the 
probabilities of the possible scenarios are perceived [76]-[78]. A possible criterion could be 
maximizing the difference between the attributes profits and security impacts. For each 
alternative under each scenario the resulting outcome (value of the attribute) is calculated. 
The best-known single criterion decision paradigms were applied to the presented problem 
and the results are summarized below. Additional description of this study can be found in 
chapter 11 of [9]. The first three paradigms are based on subjective assumptions on the 
scenario likelihoods, while the last two use probability data obtained from historical data or 
through calculation. 
1. McLximin paradigm: This is a pessimistic rule. It assumes that whatever action is 
taken, the worst scenario for that action will happen. The alternative that has the 
"best' worst outcome is selected. Under this rule, action 3 would be chosen. 
2. Minimax regret paradigm: Here, the regret associated with one option is 
quantified as the difference in outcome of that option and the outcome of the 
option that would have been chosen, if the future were known. For each 
alternative, the maximum regret value is identified and the alternative with 
smallest maximum regret value is picked. According to this rule, action 2 would 
be selected. 
i. Equal likelihood paradigm: This rule assumes that all scenarios have the same 
probability of happening: the alternative with the highest sum of outcomes is 
selected. This would result in the selection of action 2. 
4. Maximum expected monetary value: The outcomes are multiplied by the 
probability of occurrence of each scenario and then the balance is made of the 
expected profit and the total expected cost. Finally the option with the largest of 
these differences is chosen. The probabilities of each scenario from Table 6-2 are 
used here. In this case this would be action 4. 
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5. Maximizing Profits minus Risk: Instead of looidng at the security impacts in each 
scenario, a risk index can be calculated using the approaches developed in [9]-
[13]. The risk values for each action are presented in Table 6-5. Here, we account 
for transient instability, assuming the overload and voltage instability risks are 
zero. The probability of the instability event is considered in this paradigm, which 
depends on scenario likelihood and the probability of instability given the 
scenario. The alternative with the highest difference between profits and risk is 
selected, i.e., action 4. 
Table 6-5. Risk values. 
action I action 2 action 3 action 4 
Risk($/hr) 9.3 2.12 2.06 10.44 
6.5 Multi-criteria decision making 
6.5.1 Shortcomings of single criterion risk-based approaches 
From the results obtained in section 6.4, it is apparent that the methods that do not use 
probability data (methods 1-3) are quite conservative, i.e., they select those actions resulting 
in the safest or most secure scenarios. On the other hand, the methods that do use probability 
data (methods 4 and 5) are quite risky, i.e., they select those actions that result in the most 
dangerous scenarios. Intuitively it can be felt that a proper decision paradigm for power 
system operations should result in decisions between these two extremes. Such a decision 
paradigm is believed to be obtained via improving method 5. Specifically, with respect to 
method 5. solutions are sought that overcome the following weaknesses: 
1. Risk measure does not tell the whole story 
The use of risk as single measure of the security level alone might be not enough. As 
indicated before, risk is the mean of the cost consequences (or expected impact) of an 
insecurity event. It is probable that two operating points with the same risk value 
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correspond to two totally different situations. One situation may lead to catastrophic 
consequences but with low probability. The other situation may have a high 
probability of occurrence, but the impact is low. Although they have the same risk 
value (expected impact), the operator is certainly not indifferent to these cases. Risk 
alone does not distinguish the preference of the operator between these two cases. 
2. Incommensurability of risk and profits 
The values for the profits obtained with each alternative appear to be incommensurate 
with the values for risk. An increase of risk by SI is not compensated by an increase 
of profit by SI. Since risk is the product of probability and impact, the sometimes-
large impact is weighted by the very low occurrence probability of the insecurity 
events, resulting in a small risk value. Adhering to the alternatives suggested this way 
leads to exclusively profit driven operation of the system. In reality, plant operators 
have a more conservative attitude, and they do consider security aspects. The above-
mentioned objective (maximizing profits minus risk) therefore does not reflect the 
operator's attitude and, thus, its use as such should not be recommended. 
Several ways exist to distinguish the 2 cases mentioned in weakness no. 1. One of 
them is using higher order moments, like for example, the variance (VO or standard deviation 
(a) of the impact (Eq. 6-1) [79]. It measures the deviation fi-om the mean, and it is a good 
way to evaluate the uncertainty associated with an alternative. Minimizing the uncertainty is 
now a third criterion. From this point on. only the standard deviation (a) will be used. 
Returning to the two cases mentioned in comment no. I, they can now be distinguished, since 
the first case would have a very large cr, while the a in the second case would be more 
limited. The values for the standard deviations for each option are presented in Table 6-6. 
V ( A , )  =  P r { K  I A , )  I m - { K  I A , ) - { P r { K  I A , )  I m  
c r { A , )  =  ^ V { A , )  
where A, corresponds to action /. 
(6-1) 
80 
Table 6-6. Standard deviation for each option. 
Action I Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
Profits ($/hr) 20,385 19,902 10,602 22,595 
Risk or mean ($/hr) 9.29 2.12 2.06 10.44 
Standard deviation ($/hr) 1,725 935 921 1.829 
A first step to improve the objective 'maximizing Profits minus Risk", would be to 
include a term corresponding to the standard deviation to be minimized (with a minus sign), 
which is also expressed in the same monetary units. But now, the problem mentioned in 
comment no 2 still remains, i.e., the incommensurability of the attributes to be optimized, 
now including the standard deviation. 
One way and the most common way to get around this problem would be using 
weight coefficients to give appropriate importance to each individual attribute (Eq. 6-2). 
Max f i x )  =  a  •  P r o f i t s ( x )  —  ^  •  R i s k ( T )  - / - ( T i x )  (6-2) 
The weights could be provided by the operator according to his priority with respect 
to profits, risk and cr and how he would feel about the trade-offs between them. However, 
this approach is inappropriate because the weights given like this are arbitrary: their values 
will highly depend on the state of mind of the operator at the time of the inquiry. Arbitrary 
weights will lead to inconsistent results. 
Several alternatives exist to provide values for the weights in equation 2 in a more 
systematic and robust way. The key is to obtain additional information from the Decision 
Maker (DM) from which the weights can be extracted. One possible way of doing this is by 
asking the DM to determine several sets of attribute values for which he is indifferent [77]. 
Since the problem has three criteria now, it is only natural to apply multi-criteria 
decision-making methods. Several approaches exist to deal with decision-making problems 
with various objectives or criteria, i.e. Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM). 
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Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that an alternative that optimizes all criteria is 
very unlikely to exist. In the following a summarized overview of existing approaches is 
presented, and one of them will be applied to the example presented in section 6.1. 
6.6 Literature review on multi-criteria decision making 
An intuitive way of dealing with multiple criteria has always been attributing weights 
to the criteria according to their importance in the eyes of the DM. In [80] this decision­
making methodology is approached from an academic point of view. In the 60's and the 70's 
a lot of effort was spent on the development of the value and utility theory and its application 
to problems with multiple objectives through the use of multi-attribute utility functions 
[81][82]. A derivative from these methods came out in 1980, Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) [83], and was particularly suited for problems in which the criteria present a 
hierarchical structure. In the early 70's a new kind of approach emerged, the outranking 
methods, introducing a more subtle relation between alternatives, the outranking relation. 
Several different versions and adaptations appeared having many applications in Europe 
[84]-[88]. More recent developments of these methods can be found in [89]. 
The 80's brought a wide proliferation of methods with varying degrees of success. 
Therefore, a classification of the methods became necessary. A comprehensive survey of 
MCDM methods and applications is presented in [95] and [96]. A comparison of the results 
obtained with several methods applied to one problem is presented in [97]. Another excellent 
overview including more recent methods is presented in [98]. 
6.7 Overview 
The most reliable measure for a method is the degree of confidence the DM has in the 
method. For relatively simple problems, the decision made with the aid of MCDM should be 
compared with the decision the DM would make without any assistance. By giving the DM 
many similar decision making cases and comparing the answer by different methods, the one 
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that best matches the DM's natural answers can be considered as a good candidate. Another 
way to select an appropriate method is to consider methods that have been successfully 
applied to similar problems. In [96], several questions are listed to help the user to evaluate 
different multiple criteria decision-making methods. 
Most of the books dealing with MCDM make a succinct classification of the existing 
methods. Here, a more detailed classification is proposed. First, it is necessary to distinguish 
the characteristics of a decision-making problem. A problem can be characterized by single 
or multiple criteria, by having either a finite countable number of alternatives or an infinite 
number. Objective probability data can be used to make a decision or subjective probabilities 
can be assumed, or it might happen that no uncertainty is involved. The methods can also be 
distinguished by their outcome: some only return a complete ranking with or without ties, or 
just the best one. or others will return a structured set of alternatives. Table 6-7 provides a 
classification of the methods. The top of each column shows different groups of methods, 
and the rows indicate various characteristics. Any other method can be added in one of the 
existing columns or by creating a new column if it has a different mix of characteristics. 
Additional rows can be added to include more characteristics like e.g. the number of 
alternatives. For example, optimization algorithms would require an extra column with the 
indication of an infinite number of alternatives, single or multiple objectives, no use of 
probability data, and the outcome is an individual solution if existing. 
Methods involving multiple criteria have the particularity that they do not and cannot 
provide an 'optimal solution'. The process to get a 'solution' - perhaps the term 'suggestion' 
would be more appropriate - is based on additional subjective information provided by the 
decision-maker characterizing his or her preference. 
6.8 ELECTREIV 
In most MCDM methods, the outcome results in a ranking of the alternatives, with 
possible ties. However, in some situations, given the preferences of the DM, no distinction 
can be made between alternatives. In spite of this evidence that no distinction should be 
made, it appears that many methods are forcing this distinction by making overly strong 
83 
Table 6-7. Multicriteria decision making methods. 
Minimax, 
Maximin, 
Minimax regret 
Expected 
monetary 
value 
Multi attribute 
utility function, 
AHP,MACBETH* 
Outranking 
methods 
Fuzzy Sets and 
Rough Sets 
based methods 
Number of 
objectives Single single multiple multiple multiple 
Use of objective 
probability data 
no yes yes/no no fuzzy/rough 
Outcome of the 
method 
rank rank rank 
Structured 
set of 
altematives 
rank 
"Mexsuring Aiiractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation TecHnique 
assumptions on the preferences stated by the DM, and some methods cannot provide any 
solution at all. These cases are due to the requirement that each alternative should be 
comparable (preferred or equivalent) becomes restrictive. In the approach presented in this 
section, ELECTRE IV, this restriction is omitted. It allows declaring two altematives 
incomparable with each other. 
The first of a series of outranking methods called ELECTRE appeared in 1968, and 
after that several more developed and advanced versions came out [84]-[90]. In section 6.9, 
the ELECTRE IV method will be applied to the decision-making case presented in section 
6.1. Each step of the method will be explained in detail. 
6.8.1 Principles of the ELECTRE IV method 
From all the existing methods, ultimately the basic version of the ELECTRE IV 
method was chosen, which is based on the outranking principle [98]. It is by no means the 
only method that could have been applied to it, but the following reasons made it more 
attractive than others: 
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1. The amount of information required from the DM is limited and easier to 
provide. For example, there is no need to give relative importance of the 
criteria. 
2. The method has been applied on real-life cases (Paris suburb expansion 
plans). 
3. The method will not draw strong conclusions if the available data does not 
permit to do so. It also provides a solution where other methods cannot due to 
insufficient data. 
4. The property assumptions (existence of function, additivity, etc.) required for 
other methods such as the multi attribute utility fijnction, are not necessary in 
the ELECTRE IV method. The result of this fact is that the method will not 
necessarily be able to provide a complete order of the alternatives. 
As mentioned in reason no. I, this method does not require the DM to express his 
priority in terms of the criteria. Instead, he or she should indicate what his/her thresholds are 
with respect to indifference and preference. An indifference threshold for a particular 
criterion is the maximum change in the attribute of that criterion for wfiich the DM is 
indifferent. In more common language, it is the largest change that goes unnoticed. A 
preference threshold is the smallest difference between two attributes of one criterion for 
which the DM can make a preference. These thresholds can be either fLxed or dependent on 
the value of the attribute for a particular criterion. The indifference threshold can also be 
regarded as a way to take into account the inaccuracy of the pay-ofT values. The main steps 
are of the method are as follows: 
Step 1: setting the thresholds 
For an action a being strictly preferred to an action a' with respect to criterion i, the 
following condition should be fijlfilled. g,ia) is the level of satisfaction or the score of 
alternative a with respect to criterion i 
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g , ( a )  >  g , { a )  +  p , { g ^ { a ) )  
wherepi is the preference threshold given as a function ofgi(a'). 
An action a would be called weakly preferred to an action a' with respect to criterion 
gi. if the following condition is satisfied. 
g, (a') + p.(g.(a')) > g,(a) > g,(a') + qSgSa )) 
where qi is the indifference threshold depending on the valuegi(a'). 
This concept of thresholds is illustrated in Figure 6-1. The value u represents the 
difference between the scores of two alternatives for one criterion. 
u  =  g , ( a ' ) - g ^ ( a )  ( m > 0 )  
When u is smaller than qj, a and a' are said to be indifferent to each other for criterion j 
(1). For II between qj and pj, a' is declared weakly preferred to a (2), while when u is larger 
than pj (3), a' is strictly preferred to a. The veto threshold (vy) is used in step 3 to distinguish 
between strong and weak outranking relations. 
The same reasoning is applicable when u is defined as 
n  =  g , {<^) -gAa' )  ( / />0)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
qj Pi Vj u 
Figure 6-1. Preference and indifference thresholds. 
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Step 2 - checking the strong and weak preferences 
With the thresholds provided in the first step, the alternatives should be compared 
with each other for their scores for the different criteria. It is evaluated for how many criteria 
one alternative is preferred to another one. And this is repeated for three levels of 
preferences: weak, strong and veto. The veto preference has usually a threshold that is two 
times the strong preference threshold. 
Step 3: defining the outranking relations 
Now. two outranking relations are introduced, based on the previous preference 
concepts. 
aSpa' a strongly outranks a* if no criterion e.xist for which a' is strictly preferred to 
a and the number of criteria for which a' is weakly preferred to a is at most equal to the 
number of criteria for which a is preferred (weakly or strongly) to a'. 
aSja' a weakly outranks a' if no criterion exists for which a' is strictly preferred to 
a, but the second condition for the strong outranking is not fulfilled; or if there exists a 
unique criterion for which a' is strictly preferred to a, under the condition that the difference 
in favor of a' is not larger than the veto threshold and that a is strictly preferred for at least 
half of the criteria. 
Step 4: distillation 
In this step it is verified for each action how many other actions it strongly outranks, 
and by how many other actions it is strongly outranked. The difference between both is 
called the strong qualification. A weak qualification is obtained in a similar fashion. 
Two rankings are obtained. For the first one, descending distillation, the action with 
the largest strong qualification is selected and will receive the rank number 1. The 
qualifications of the remaining alternatives are recalculated, this time without the selected 
alternative. The alternative that has the highest qualification is selected this time for the 
second spot. This is continued until all alternatives have been selected. In case of a tie in the 
strong qualifications, the weak qualifications are used to break the tie. 
87 
A second ranking, ascending distillation, is obtained by using the same procedure, but 
now the alternative with the lowest strong qualification is selected for the lowest rank. The 
qualifications are recalculated again, and again the alternative with the lowest is selected. 
This is repeated until all options are selected. 
Step 5: final ranking 
A final ranking is obtained by combining the two rankings obtained in the previous 
step. This ranking can be represented by a graph. An arrow points from a node representing 
the preferred action to the node of the outranked action (e.g., a to b. Figure 6-2). Two 
equivalent actions are represented by the same node (d and e). Actions that are incomparable 
are not linked with an arrow, but are located at the same ranking level (b and c). This means 
that, when comparing b and c, there are not only strong reasons in favor of b and against c, 
but also strong reasons in favor of c and against b. Both b and c are outranking d and e. but 
are worse than a. 
6.9 Results obtained with ELECTREIV 
The ELECTRE IV method will now be applied to the decision problem presented in 
section 6.1. 
Step 1 - defining the thresholds. 
Lets assume that the Decision Maker chooses the following thresholds. The veto 
thresholds are taken as the double of the preference threshold. The values in Table 6-8 are 
percentages of the score of an alternative for a particular criterion. 
b 
c 
Figure 6-2. Example of final order with ELECTRE IV. 
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Table 6-8. Threshold values. 
% Indifference Preference Veto 
Profits 30 50 100 
Risk 5 20 40 
Variance 15 40 80 
Step 2 - checking the strong and weak preferences 
The following tables indicate for how many criteria the action at the left of a row is 
preferred to the action at the top of the column. Table 6-9 refers to the weak preference. 
Table 6-10 to the strong preference while Table 6-11 shows the result with respect to the veto 
preference. 
Table 6-9. Weak preferences. 
Weak preference 
Action / Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
Action / 0 0 1 
Action 2 0 0 0 
Action 3 0 0 0 
Action 4 0 0 0 
Table 6-10. Strong preferences. 
Strict Preference 
Action I Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
Action I 0 1 0 
Action 2 2 1 2 
Action 3 2 0 2 
Action 4 0 0 1 
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Table 6- 11 - Veto preferences 
Veto Preference 
Action I Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
Action I 0 0 0 
Action 2 I 0 1 
Action 3 1 0 1 
Action 4 0 0 1 
Step 3 - outranking relations 
In this step for each pair of actions, it is decided whether one action strongly or 
weakly outranks the other or not at all. It can also happen that two actions outrank each other. 
Consequently, the outranking hypothesis should be checked in both directions. 
An 'F* indicates that the action at left outranks strongly the action at the top of the 
column. On the other hand a lowercase T points towards a weak outranking relation. The 
results are shown in Table 6-12. It can be seen here that action 1 strongly outranks action 4. 
but on the other hand action 4 weakly outranks action I. 
Table 6-12 - Weak and strong outranking relations 
Outranking 
Action I Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
Action I 0 0 F 
Action 2 F F F 
Action 3 f f 0 
Action 4 f 0 0 
Step 4 - distillation procedure 
Table 6-12 is now used to extract two rankings, one using descending distillation, and 
one using ascending distillation. In Table 6-13 the numbers below each action refer to the 
actions that are strongly outranked by the action in the first row. In Table 6-14 the weakly 
outranked actions are listed. 
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Table 6-13 - Strong outranking relations 
Action I Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
4 1,3,4 
Table 6-14 - Weak outranking relations 
Action 1 Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
1,2 1 
The qualifications can now be obtained for each action. The strong qualification for 
an action is the difference between the number of actions that it strongly outranks with the 
number of actions it is strongly outranked by. A weak qualification is similarly obtained in a 
similar fashion. The results are displayed in Table 6-15 and in Table 6-16. 
Table 6-15. Strong qualifications. 
Action 1 Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
0 3 -I -2 
Table 6-16. Weak qualifications. 
Action I Action 2 Action 3 Action 4 
-2 -1 0 0 
The descending distillation works as follows: The action with the highest strong 
qualification is chosen. In this case it is action 2. In the case of an ex-aequo. the weak 
qualifications are used to untie. When even the weak qualifications are the same, the 2 
actions are .selected and considered equivalent for that ranking procedure. Action 2 is ranked 
first and consequently removed from Table 6-13 and Table 6-14; the new qualifications are 
calculated. The distillation procedure is continued until all actions are ranked. The ranking 
obtained this way is: 
2 ^  1 ^ 3,4 
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Action 3 and 4 are equivalent in this ranking. The ascending distillation works in the 
same way but starts by selecting the action with the lowest strong qualification, which is 
action 4. It is ranked last and then removed from the two tables, etc. The ranking obtained 
like this gives: 
2 ^ 3 - » l ^ 4  
Step 5 - graphical final order 
From the two rankings obtained in the previous step, a final order can be extracted. 
We see that in both rankings, action 2 is on the first spot. So this will be the action with the 
first priority. Next, we see that I and 3 have the spots 2 and 3 respectively in the first 
ranking, and spots 3 and 2 in the second ranking. Those two actions are declared 
incomparable. Finally, we see that both actions 1 and 3 are ranked higher than action 4 in any 
of the rankings. Action 4 will have the last priority. Graphically, the relations can be 
visualized as shown in figure 6-3. 
1 
3 
Figure 6-3. Final ranking. 
From this result, the DM knows that there are strong reasons that favor action 2 over 
all the others, while no strong reasons against this decision exist. Due to the fact that the 
method allows incomparability', it does not recommend - in this case - a second-best 
solution, as Action 1 and 3 are incomparable; should a choice between 1 an 3 be necessary, 
the DM would have to analyze the alternatives further to make a final decision. However, it 
should be pointed out that, if a complete order (without ties) of the alternatives is desired, 
other variants of the ELECTRE IV method could be employed, as well as other outranking 
methods [91]. 
' This characteristic is also called non-prescriptivencss. 
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6.10 Sensitivity analysis 
The results presented above only refer to one set of thresholds. It is recoinmended to 
verify how solid the suggested results are for slight changes in the data, in particular, in the 
data provided by the DM. When changing the thresholds, one of the major advantages of the 
ELECTRE IV method becomes obvious: the influence of the thresholds, i.e., the input of the 
DM. on the final result is only partial. 
This is as opposed to the multi-criteria method with scaling coefficients, where 
almost any alternative can come out on top depending exclusively on the value of the 
weights. This leads to a much greater responsibility for the DM. With the ELECTRE IV 
method, the final solution is determined for a great deal by the values of the attributes and 
only partially by the information given by the DM. In the following the results are shown of 
the application of the ELECTRE IV method to several different sets of thresholds (Table 6-
17 to Table 6-22). 
Table 6-17. Example 1 
Q p V 
Profits 0 0.4 0.8 
Risk 0 0.2 0.4 
St. Deviation 0 0.4 0.8 
4 
3 
Figure 6-4. Graphical final order of example I 
Table 6-18. Example 2 
Q p V 
Profits 0 0.05 0.1 
Risk 0 0.05 0.1 
St. Deviation 0 0.05 0.1 
2 4 3 I 
Figure 6-5. Graphical final order of example 2 
Table 6-19. Example 3 
Q P V 
Profits 0.4 0.5 1.0 
Risk 0.4 0.5 I.O 
St. Deviation 0.4 0.5 1.0 
Figure 6-6. Graphical final order of example 3 
Table 6-20. Example 4 
Q P V 
Profits 0.4 0.4 0.8 
Risk 0.2 0.2 0.4 
St. Deviation 0.4 0.4 0.8 
2 1,3.4 
Figure 6-7. Graphical final order of example 4 
Table 6-21. Example 5 
Q P V 
Profits 0.2 0.4 0.8 
Risk 0 0.05 0.1 
St. Deviation 0.2 0.4 0.8 
2 13 4 
Figure 6-8. Graphical final order of example 5 
Table 6-22. Example 6 
Q P V 
Profits 0.2 0.4 0.8 
Risk 0.2 0.4 0.8 
St. Deviation 0 0.05 0.1 
Figure 6-9. Graphical final order of example 6 
Table 6-23. Example 7 
Q P V 
Profits 0 0.05 0.1 
Risk 0.2 0.4 0.8 
St. Deviation 0.2 0.4 0.8 
Figure 6-10. Graphical final order of example 7 
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As the results suggest, when the different thresholds are changed over a large range, 
alternative 2 always remains among the favorites. The influence of the thresholds is more 
perceptible in the ranks of less attractive alternatives. 
Generally speaking, the ranking of an alternative will improve, as the threshold for 
the criterion for which it performs best, gets tighter. An example of this is alternative 4, 
which has the highest profits. When making the thresholds for the profits tighter, alternative 
4 will rise in the ranking. 
6.11 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter describes how risk can be used in decision making for power system 
operation. First, a decision making case is presented where a plant operator has to choose 
among several operating alternatives for the next hour. Different, single criterion decision­
making strategies are applied to this problem and their weaknesses are exposed. It is 
explained why variance should also be included in the decision-making problem. 
Next, it is argued that multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) techniques are 
more suitable for this kind of problems. An over\'iew of the existing MCDM methods is 
presented, and one of them is applied to the stated problem and the results are discussed. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
7.1 Contribution of tiiis work 
The main topic of the work presented in this dissertation is the quantification of 
transient instability risk. The complete methodology and some important related issues have 
been addressed. The following list summarizes the most significant contributions presented 
in this dissertation. 
Risk of transient instability assessment method 
Elaboration of detailed probability expressions 
Expressions for computing the risk of transient instability are evolved to include 
probabilistic models for the uncertainties regarding the fault occurrence, location of the 
fault on the line, the type fault, the fault clearing time, and the pre-fault load levels. 
Influencing factors for transient instability risk 
The influence on the maximum generation limit of various factors including the fault 
and operating parameters are evaluated, and it was found that the errors on the fault 
clearing time does considerably affect this limit: situations are identified that are 
deterministically secure, but have a risk value greater than zero. It is also shown that 
other parameters, such as the terminal voltage level and local load, have a smaller but 
significant influence on the risk. 
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Evaluation of the impact of transient instability 
The different components of the impact resulting from a transient instability event are 
identified and modeled. 
Use of hybrid transient stability assessment method 
The hybrid method allows termination of the transient stability simulation as soon as 
the (in)stability has been detected and evaluates the degree of (in)stability. This method 
is integrated in the risk calculation algorithm. 
Development of a software package 
A software package was developed to implement the risk of transient instability 
calculation methodology. 
Fast risk assessment 
Several techniques are suggested to improve the speed of the risk calculation and to 
make the method more practical. In particular, the use of artificial neural networks for 
risk-based nomogram plotting is illustrated. 
Risk-based decision making for power system op)eration 
A method is provided to approach the problem of decision-making in power system 
operation as a multi-criteria decision making problem to which multi-criteria decision 
making tools can be applied, with the following three criteria: maximizing expected 
profits, minimizing risk associated with each action, and minimizing the variance of the 
impact of each action. 
7.2 Further work 
It would also be worthwhile to evaluate the impact of transient instability in terms of 
the effect on the risk of cascading events and islanding of the system. 
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The evaluation of the risk has already been developed for most security problems. 
However, it would be of great interest to also develop a method to calculate the risk of 
oscillatory instability. Due to the interest that many utilities have in the problem, the risk 
method to quantify risk of voltage dip violation should be developed further; the method 
should be implemented and solutions should be found to reduce its computation time. 
It would also be significant to combine all risks indices into one composite risk index, 
as is suggested in [99], where this composite risk could be used to plot contours of equal risk 
in risk-based nomograms and to incorporated in a decision support tool based on the concepts 
developed in this dissertation. At the same time, it would also be necessary to determine 
composite variance. 
In this work, it was assumed the different options available to the decision-maker 
were known. It is therefore necessary to develop a procedure to define a set of credible and 
reasonable corrective actions for the decision-maker to choose from in using the decision aid 
tool. 
7.3 Conclusions 
The motivation behind this work is that it is essential for the operators to know more 
than just the deterministic operating limits for their system, and in the case of transient 
instability, the limits for the generators. As mentioned earlier, transient instability risk is a 
part of risk based security assessment, which offers a new way of dealing with power system 
security by looking at the probability of the insecurity events and the consequences of these 
events. Transient instability is a particular type of insecurity that is complicated to assess, 
requiring special attention to make the risk calculation not too time-consuming. It also allows 
identification of the risk associated with deterministically secure situations. 
The results show that system operation could be improved by taking into account the 
risk associated with an operating point. Besides revealing operating areas within the 
deterministically secure region with low or no risk, the method also measures the risk outside 
the secure region. This opens possibilities for an operator who is not risk averse and would 
be prepared to operate outside the secure area if, according to the decision maker, the 
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expected benefits exceeds the risk. This capability is of great interest in the competitive 
electric power industry. 
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